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Rethinking Grid Governance for the
Climate Change Era
Shelley Welton*
The electricity sector is often appropriately called the linchpin of
efforts to respond to climate change. Over the next few decades, the
U.S. electricity sector will need to double in size to accommodate
electric vehicles, while transforming to run entirely on clean energy.
To drive this transformation, states are increasingly adopting 100
percent clean energy targets. But fossil fuel corporations are pushing
back, seeking to maintain their structural domination of the U.S.
energy sector. This Article calls attention to one central but underscrutinized way that these companies impede the clean energy
transition: incumbent fossil fuel companies essentially run the United
States’ electricity grid, writing its rules in ways that favor their private
interests at the expense of societal goals.
In most of the country, entities known as Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) manage the electricity grid under Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversight. These
organizations, formed in the late 1990s, have a distinct intellectual
lineage in the privatization and new governance movements of that
time. Most RTOs are structured as private industry clubs, in which
industry members “vote” on the rules for regional electricity markets
and grid operation. This governance arrangement has proven
successful at maintaining a reliable grid but often serves as an
impediment to progress on clean energy. Over the twenty years of their
existence, many RTOs have resisted incorporating clean energy and
energy conservation measures into their grids and market rules,
despite strong evidence that treating these resources commensurately
would lower costs and improve market functionality. Now, several
regions are pursuing reforms in the name of “investor confidence”
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and “fuel security” that privilege coal and natural gas resources—the
same fossil fuels that many states are trying to phase out of their
energy mix.
This Article contends that the United States’ functionally
privatized mode of electricity governance must be reevaluated as
regulatory priorities shift in response to climate change. U.S.
electricity law suffers from a gaping and growing accountability gap,
in which neither FERC nor states have the authority needed to make
electricity markets bend to democratically established prerogatives
that harm industry incumbents. To remedy the situation, federal and
state regulators need more robust authority to shape energy market
rules to public aims. Drawing from informative differences across
RTOs, the Article concludes with four reform pathways, suggesting
that FERC or Congress might (1) pare back RTOs’ responsibilities,
(2) enhance state and federal oversight capabilities, (3) police
corporate agglomeration in the sector, and (4) explore public
ownership or control over the grid.
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INTRODUCTION
The good news: over the last fifteen years, the United States’ greenhouse
gas emissions have fallen roughly 12 percent.1 The bad: this decline is mostly
due to the replacement of one particularly dirty fossil fuel—coal—with a slightly
cleaner fossil fuel—natural gas.2 More recently, the coronavirus pandemic
contributed to a further drop in emissions, but as one commentator succinctly put
it, “I think it’s safe to say nobody wants to see greenhouse gasses reduced this
way.”3
The replacement of coal by natural gas should similarly receive little
celebration, as this strategy is incapable of reducing emissions to the degree
necessary to avoid catastrophic levels of climate change.4 What this strategy does
produce, perversely, is more long-lived fossil fuel infrastructure whose value
companies fight hard to preserve. Some of these self-preservation efforts have
received substantial media and scholarly attention, including the decades-long,
industry-funded climate change denial campaign.5 But others are more covert.
This Article argues that one central but under-scrutinized way that fossil fuel
companies maintain dominance is by essentially running the United States’

1. See Trevor Houser & Hannah Pitt, Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2019, RHODIUM
GRP. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-2019 [https://perma.cc/7BTSBWRC].
2. See id. Natural gas combustion has half the carbon emissions of coal and considerably fewer
local air pollutant emissions. However, methane leaks during natural gas production offset a contested
portion of its carbon benefits. See Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the
U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 186, 186 (2018) (finding considerably higher methane
emissions from natural gas than were reported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); Ellen
Knickmeyer & Seth Borenstein, Americans’ Energy Use Surges Despite Climate Change Concern, AP
NEWS
(Apr.
18,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/7d4c9cc8f8c344fb9b800a5fd9c48866?hootPostID=a01ce7fe3ddb461beeac
b635b1aa0bf7 [https://perma.cc/JBA9-QLKC] (reflecting 10 percent increase in U.S. natural gas
consumption in 2018).
3. Paul Huttner, Forecast: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Fall 7.5-Percent in 2020, MPR
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:20 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/04/08/us-greenhouse-gasemissions-may-fall-75percent-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/VMY3-RJJA].
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK. M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 169
(2011).
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electricity grid, writing its rules in ways that favor their private interests at the
expense of public clean energy goals.
Scholars, the media, and politicians have begun to turn a critical eye toward
structural corporate domination in many U.S. economic sectors—most notably,
banking and the Internet.6 They have paid less attention to the electricity
industry, even though its byzantine regulatory structure is ripe for abuse by a
small number of powerful incumbents. In most of the country,7 the electricity
grid is managed by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), whose
primary charge is to keep your lights on by managing the transmission grid and
operating regional electricity markets.8
These RTOs are, to be blunt, hardly anyone’s ideal governance structure.
RTOs were born out of the deregulatory fever that swept through the U.S.
economy beginning in the 1970s.9 Proponents of electricity deregulation
believed that greater competition among electricity suppliers would drive down
prices and spur innovation in the sector.10 However, full-throated deregulation is
impossible in electricity, given the persistence of natural monopoly
characteristics and the requirement of a perfect balance between supply and
demand of electrons across the grid at all times.11 Consequently, as the Federal

6. See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, TAKING ANTITRUST AWAY FROM THE COURTS: A
STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REVERSING THE SECOND AGE OF MONOPOLY POWER 3 (2018); ANDREW
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW
GILDED AGE 16 (2018); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 236 (2017); Elizabeth Warren,
Here’s
How
We
Can
Break
up
Big
Tech,
MEDIUM
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
[https://perma.cc/5LSV-PYCA]; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 10, 13 (2010).
7. This Article does not discuss those regions of the country that have decided not to join
RTOs—the Southeast and much of the West. A companion work-in-progress, The States that Opted
Out, examines the status of electricity governance in those regions.
8. These grid managers are also called “Independent System Operators” (ISOs) in some
regions. In this article, except where relevant for purposes of historical accuracy, I intend RTOs to
include ISOs, as “[t]he difference between an ISO and RTO is largely semantic these days.” Devin
Hartman, Wholesale Electricity Markets in the Technological Age, R ST. POL’Y STUDY NO. 67, Aug.
2016, at 3 n.5.
9. See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY
L.J. 543, 545–46 (2007) (describing how FERC “has increasingly relied on market forces rather than
cost-of-service regulation to provide the ‘just and reasonable’ rates” that the Federal Power Act
requires); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998) (detailing this broader trend); David B. Spence, Can Law
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 766 (2008) (describing conflicts
embedded in energy-market deregulation).
10. Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization, 29 ENERGY J.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 9, 11 (2008) (suggesting that competitive wholesale markets should “provide better
incentives for controlling construction and operating costs of new and existing generating capacity” and
should “encourage innovation in power supply technologies,” among other benefits).
11. See FERC Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811
(issued Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 2000] (endorsing
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Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) worked to make electricity
provisioning more competitive in the 1990s, it determined that intermediary
organizations would be necessary to coordinate the emerging marketplace.12 In
designing these organizations, FERC embraced the intellectual and pragmatic
trends of the times, which favored privatization and “new governance”-style
arrangements that emphasized collaboration between industry and regulators.13
RTOs are institutions distinctly cut from this cloth. They are private membership
clubs in which incumbent industry members make the rules for electricity
markets and the electricity grid through private mini-democracies—with voting
privileges reserved for RTO members—under broad regulatory authority.14
When FERC created RTOs, the agency did not fully anticipate the vital role
that these institutions would grow to play in controlling energy markets and U.S.
energy infrastructure; nor did it anticipate the ways in which public objectives
for the sector stood on the precipice of significant change.15 Thus, perhaps FERC
can be forgiven for its initial faith in a “[l]ighter-[h]anded” regulatory structure.16
Two decades later, however, this faith is demonstrably misplaced.
In the last two years alone, ten states as well as Washington, D.C., and
Puerto Rico have adopted 100 percent clean energy targets by legislation or
executive order, thereby setting the United States on a plausible course toward
real climate progress.17 With a new presidential administration now committed
to rapid climate action, there is considerable hope that clean energy progress will
accelerate. But achieving these goals requires the cooperation of RTOs, which
must manage the integration of these resources into their grids and markets.
competition but proposing intermediary organizations to manage “operational and reliability issues”);
infra Part I.
12. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811; infra Part I.
13. See infra Part I.A (tracing RTOs’ intellectual genealogy). See also JON D. MICHAELS,
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 106 (2017) (tracing
the intellectual lineage of a wide range of privatization techniques). I am sympathetic to William Boyd’s
view that “[o]ne could, of course, consider the entire history of public utility regulation as an effort to
create and sustain various types of hybrid institutions.” William Boyd, Public Utility and the LowCarbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1663 n.194 (2014). Viewed in that light, RTOs are one
particularly neoliberal version of this hybridism that I believe to be singularly ill-advised.
14. This description is overgeneralized. See infra Part II.B–C and Shelley Welton, Appendix A
(Feb. 2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/print/rethinking-grid-governance, for more on
specific RTO structures.
15. See Kenneth Rose, Trouble in Market Paradise: Development of the Regional Transmission
Operator, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 535, 536 (2016) (explaining that RTOs have “developed and grown over
time, taking on an increasing responsibility and importance”); see also infra Part III (on RTOs and the
climate change challenge).
16. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 827.
17. Hawaii was the first state to pass such a law, in 2015. See UCLA LUSKIN CTR. FOR
INNOVATION, PROGRESS TOWARD 100% CLEAN ENERGY IN CITIES & STATES ACROSS THE U.S. 2
(2019); Julia Pyper, Tracking Progress on 100% Clean Energy Targets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 12,
2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/tracking-progress-on-100-clean-energy-targets
[https://perma.cc/GR9E-DJ6P] (reporting that “[s]even states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia, have passed 100 percent clean energy transition laws,” and several others have executive
orders to the same effect).
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Certain RTOs have at times acted as partners, amending their rules to ensure that
clean energy resources can participate in the grid.18 Increasingly, however, RTOs
have used their control over market rules to erect problematic impediments to
progress on clean energy.
This Article argues that RTOs’ failures on this score can be traced to their
functionally privatized governance systems, which are now making public policy
decisions that they were never designed to address. RTOs have a myopic focus
on grid reliability and growth in electricity supply that is at odds with public
objectives for the sector. Consequently, many RTOs have actively resisted
incorporating demand-side technologies, small-scale renewables, and energy
storage into their grids and market rules, despite evidence that treating these
resources commensurately would lower costs and improve market
functionality.19 Now, several regions have adopted reforms in the name of
“investor confidence” and “fuel security” that punish renewable resources while
privileging the same fossil fuels that many states are trying to phase out of their
energy mix.20
This Article contends that U.S. grid governance must be redesigned to
accommodate a new era of regulatory priorities that include responding to
climate change.21 RTOs are able to adopt positions against new clean energy
technologies because their hybrid, quasi-governmental institutional structures
allow incumbent industry members to dominate stakeholder processes.
Moreover, these same incumbents have dramatically concentrated their
governance power through a trend of mergers over the last decade-plus, all while
legislation and court precedent have narrowed FERC’s oversight tools and its
ability to force change when the agency’s priorities diverge from those of
RTOs.22 States, too, have struggled to retain their statutory authority over
generation resources under increasingly marketized conditions.23

18. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems:
Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21
ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 222, 225–26 (2016) (describing the Midwest ISO’s successful integration
of wind energy); Tom Kleckner, Another Wind Penetration Record for SPP, RTO INSIDER (Apr. 6,
2018), https://rtoinsider.com/spp-wind-penetration-record-89917 [https://perma.cc/3AEG-6SRZ]; Tom
Kleckner, Overheard at the Great Plains Institute SPP Workshop, RTO INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://rtoinsider.com/great-plains-institute-spp-82580 [https://perma.cc/T3A8-S3BP] (discussing wind
integration in the Southwest Power Pool).
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. At last, some members of Congress appear to agree; in June 2019 congressional hearings,
the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy urged FERC to holistically
review RTO governance policies. Michael Brooks, FERC Probed on RTO Governance, Market Issues,
RTO INSIDER (June 13, 2019), https://rtoinsider.com/ferc-probed-rto-governance-market-issues138272 [https://perma.cc/XN94-QZDL].
22. See infra Part II.D.
23. The Federal Power Act explicitly gives states the right to choose how to source their
electricity. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2018); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288,
1292 (2016).
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The result is a growing accountability gap, in which neither FERC nor
states have the authority needed to make electricity markets bend to
democratically established prerogatives that harm industry incumbents. The
problem is not regional grid governance per se. More robust regional
collaboration—and perhaps ultimately a single national grid—is a prerequisite
to integrating sufficient renewable energy into the U.S. energy system.24 For this
reason, the Article’s preferred solution is to restructure regional grid governance,
reclaiming it for public control rather than abandoning it.25
In constructing its narrative of grid governance as untenably privatized, the
Article stakes a claim contrary to those in energy law who see the RTO model
as admirable or, at least, not an inherent obstacle to responding to climate
change.26 Despite intense interest in energy federalism in recent years,27 there
has largely been a reflexive scholarly acceptance of RTOs.28 This Article seeks
to upend that acceptance. As the Article’s excavation of RTOs’ record on clean
energy illustrates, these organizations should not be treated as benign partners
ready to accept and effectuate the popular will on climate change.29 Instead, grid

24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part V.
26. This effort accords with work by William Boyd and David Spence questioning the ability
of electricity markets as currently designed to accomplish climate change aims. See Boyd, supra note
13, 1683–1708; David Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 976 (2017).
However, neither Boyd nor Spence diagnoses RTO governance as a critical flaw underpinning
electricity market disfunction.
27. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 3, 3 (2017); Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in
the New World of Energy Federalism, 67 EMORY L.J. 921, 924 (2018); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path
of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 400 (2016); Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by
Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2017); Hannah J.
Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 293, 294 (2016).
28. After an early article questioning the RTO structure, see Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note
9, at 544, the field has largely gone silent on questions of grid governance. Several scholars have
celebrated RTOs as intermediaries of federalist tensions in energy law, a characterization I agree with
in its theoretical potential but contest in its current implementation. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah
J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 53 (celebrating RTOs as a bridge
between state and federal regulators); Lyons, supra note 27, at 972 (urging “greater reliance on regional
cooperative-federalism structures such as RTOs”). Several legal scholars have also analyzed the
problem of “market power” in electricity markets, by which certain firms game market rules to increase
profits. These scholars appropriately raise questions about regulators’ abilities to police such abusive
behaviors. But either explicitly or implicitly, these analyses accept the basic governance structures of
RTOs. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11 (2005); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Oversight of
Restructured Electricity Markets, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 297,
300 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131,
131 (2012); Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and
Competition in Electricity, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 928–32 (2013).
29. For this reason, absent governance reform, I am skeptical of ongoing efforts to give RTOs
control over carbon pricing. See Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1080–82 (2018).
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governance reform should itself be a priority of those who seek to advance
decarbonization in the United States.
To build its case, the Article draws from a growing body of scholarship,
largely outside the legal literature, devoted to understanding how grid
governance functions in various regions.30 These studies illuminate the
mechanisms at work inside various RTOs, but they stop short of systematically
connecting these mechanisms to many RTOs’ lackluster records on clean energy.
Drawing from dozens of clean-energy-related filings at FERC, the Article forges
these critical connections in order to diagnose the central flaw in RTO
governance as an endemic bias against new resources that threaten incumbent
profits. It argues that only enhanced public oversight and control can remedy this
bias. Fortunately, poor governance structures have not equally compromised all
RTOs. Some regional designs provide more political accountability than others,
and the Article makes use of these differences in proposing reform
recommendations.
There are four paths to better grid governance, some of which could be
pursued in combination.31 First, FERC could return RTOs to a leaner form
focused on technical tasks suited for industry management. Second, FERC could
accept that RTOs in their modern incarnation are policy-making bodies, and
increase state and federal regulators’ oversight tools commensurately. Some of
these reforms could be done by the agency; others would require congressional
intervention. Third, to enhance the legitimacy of stakeholder governance, FERC
or Congress could reduce agglomerated corporate power within the electricity
sector. Finally, and most radically, if the new administration wanted to
accomplish maximum progress on climate change, it could explore how to
transition RTOs to public ownership or control.
For those outside the field of energy law, the story of how industry
incumbents have distorted grid governance may simply appear as a
recapitulation of the dangers of privatization. But the tale told here is unique in
an instructive way. All these challenges arose within one legal framework: public
utility law. In fact, they largely arose within one statutory phrase: FERC’s
obligation to ensure that rates in the electricity sector are “just,” “reasonable,”

30. See CHRISTINA SIMEONE, PJM GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE OUTCOMES? 22
(2017); Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 222; Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, Can Capacity
Markets Be Designed by Democracy?, 53 J. REGUL. ECON. 127, 127–28 (2018); Mark James, Kevin B.
Jones, Ashleigh H. Krick & Rikaela R. Greane, How the RTO Stakeholder Process Affects Market
Efficiency, R ST. POL’Y STUDY No. 112, Oct. 2017, at 1; Jennifer Chen & Gabrielle Murnan, State
Participation in Resource Adequacy Decisions in Multistate Regional Transmission Organizations,
DUKE U. NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLUTIONS, Mar. 2019, at 1; E4THE FUTURE, INC.,
REGIONAL ENERGY MARKETS: DO INCONSISTENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IMPEDE U.S. MARKET
SUCCESS? 2 (2016).
31. See infra Part V.
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and non-discriminatory.32 Managed competition via RTOs is FERC’s latest
theory of how to accomplish this longstanding public utility mission.33
Outside energy law, public utility law is experiencing a rebirth. In other
fields suffering from concentrated corporate power, scholars are revisiting the
public utility concept as a way to rebalance those sectors toward the public
interest.34 The idea animating these proposals is that expanding the public utility
concept to new domains could provide stronger public oversight and control of
these sectors.35 I am, in general, sympathetic to the pursuit. But the framework
of public utility law did not prevent RTO actions privileging fossil fuels over
clean energy, because FERC and the courts have interpreted the public utility
charge capaciously enough to allow for the privatized model of governance
described herein. Public utility, then, has been undone from within in energy law
by blind faith in market constructs, with insufficient attention to institutional
theory and design. Understanding the transformation of public utility law within
grid governance should aid efforts to apply the normative potential of public
utility in other sectors.36
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I excavates the origins of RTOs,
situating them in their intellectual lineage. Part II traces RTOs’ development
from birth to modern form and describes the concurrent doctrinal and legislative
developments that changed the legal landscape of RTO governance. Part III
draws from multiple examples of flawed or intransigent RTO decision-making
on clean energy in order to illustrate that these governance structures are illequipped to oversee the transformation of the grid demanded by climate change.
Part IV then connects these challenges to RTO structure, arguing that the
fundamental flaw in RTOs is one of overly privatized governance. Finally, Part
V develops four categories of reforms that could align RTO governance with the
public demands placed on the grid to help manage the accelerating climate crisis.
I.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE BIRTH OF RTOS
The electricity industry consists of three basic parts: supply, transmission,
and delivery of electrons. In most of the country, RTOs hold these parts together
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b) (2018).
33. See infra Part I.
34. See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 131 (2017)
(celebrating the legal robustness of the public utility concept); Jim Rossi & Morgan Ricks, Foreword to
Revisiting the Public Utility, 35 YALE J. REGUL. 711 (2018) (special issue on “revisiting the public
utility,” with contributions considering its application across economic sectors).
35. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. REGUL.
911, 914–15 (2018) (arguing that the “public utility tradition” offers important lessons for tackling the
modern, cross-sectoral challenge of “unaccountable or arbitrary control over access to basic
infrastructure”).
36. Cf. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1619 (arguing that “public utility” should be understood “first
and foremost as a normative effort” or “undertaking” aimed at protecting the public’s interest in key
infrastructure sectors).
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by running a series of markets and dispatch algorithms that decide which
electrons should be sent where, and when, to maximize the grid’s reliability and
minimize costs. However, these grid managers are relatively new organizations.
This Part tells the story of why FERC created these strange institutional
creatures, connecting their origin story to the broader intellectual movements
toward deregulation and privatization.
From the advent of electricity until the 1990s, the industry was dominated
by vertically integrated, often investor-owned corporations that controlled all
three components of the system within their monopoly service territory. In
exchange for this privilege, the law regulated these corporations as public
utilities, subjecting their rates to close regulatory scrutiny.37 At first, this was
done on a state-by-state basis. Then, beginning in 1935 with passage of the
Federal Power Act, Congress gave FERC control over interstate wholesale sales
between utilities and interstate transmission, while explicitly leaving the states
with control over generation resources and retail sales to end-use consumers.38
This arrangement endured for many decades, with minor modifications to
adapt to changing times. As utilities began to trade more power among
themselves, several received permission from FERC to form “power pools,”
which jointly coordinated electricity dispatch to enhance system efficiencies.39
By the 1990s, several of these pools had petitioned FERC to form Independent
System Operators (ISOs) to act as more centralized dispatch agents, charged with
managing all the transmission lines within a region.40 These ISOs became the
blueprint for FERC’s later push to form larger, multi-state RTOs across the
country.41
In the 1990s, the drive for competition began in earnest in the electricity
industry.42 Some states split ownership of generation from ownership of
transmission and distribution as a way to increase industry competition.
Similarly, states experimented with “retail choice” programs, in which
consumers could shop around for an electricity provider rather than be tethered
to their designated monopoly utility.43 As more power began to flow among
utilities, FERC ordered these entities to file open access tariffs with the
Commission—a move intended to promote a more integrated power grid by
ensuring that utilities did not overcharge their competitors for use of their
37. See Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 535–36 (2008);
Spence, supra note 9, at 769.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2002) (discussing history
of Federal Power Act).
39. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 554 (describing the history of power pools).
40. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 815 (noting that ISOs had been approved or conditionally
approved for California, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland or PJM (the mid-Atlantic), New York,
New England, and the Midwest, and that Texas had established its own ISO).
41. See infra notes 92–93.
42. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 9, at 1367–68.
43. See MATHEW J. MOREY & LAURENCE D. KIRSCH, RETAIL CHOICE IN ELECTRICITY: WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED IN 20 YEARS? 3–5 (2016).
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transmission lines.44 FERC also suggested that regions explore more tightly
coordinated forms of transmission management as a way to prevent this
discrimination.45
However, open access filings proved too anemic a solution, as they did not
eliminate utilities’ ability to surreptitiously favor their own resources or grant
preferences to a limited number of collaborators.46 In 1999, FERC tried to create
a more fulsome solution by pushing for all regions to form RTOs to control
transmission.47 Notably, as with the agency’s acceptance of power pools and
independent system operators, FERC created RTOs without any new statutory
authority. Instead, the Commission used its broad and longstanding Federal
Power Act authority to ensure “just and reasonable rates.”48 To connect this
authority to its proposal, FERC explained that independent regional control of
the grid would “reduce opportunities for unduly discriminatory conduct,” enable
more efficient system dispatches, and enhance transmission planning.49 Based
on a number of modeled scenarios, the Commission estimated that RTO
formation might save $2.4 billion per year.50
In this way, FERC told a story of RTOs as the obvious answer to unfolding
events.51 But even if some novel governing arrangement may have been

44. FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (issued Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pts. 35, 385 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 888].
45. See id. at 21,594; see also Richard P. O’Neill et al., The Governance of Energy Displacement
Network Oligopolies, Office of Economic Policy 23 (Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, Discussion Paper
No.
96-08,
1996),
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/oligoply.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E5UQ-E3GE] (describing ISOs as “a step beyond functional unbundling”).
46. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 824 (explaining that functional unbundling of assets was not
enough because it was “difficult for transmission providers to implement and difficult for the market
and the Commission to monitor and police”).
47. Id. at 811, 813, 824 (“[V]ertically integrated utilities have the incentive and the opportunity
to favor their generation interests over those of their competitors.”). For more on changes leading to the
formation of RTOs, see generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION
AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (discussing the erosion of
the “utility consensus” that prevailed through the bulk of the twentieth century); Joskow, supra note 10
(situating U.S. deregulatory movement within international context); Spence, supra note 9, at 767–79.
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d–e (2018); Order 2000, supra note 11, at 837; see also Jody Freeman
& David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43–58 (2014) (describing how
FERC used longstanding Federal Power Act authority to manage deregulation). Congress provided
FERC some additional statutory authority for restructuring in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, but the
agency largely proceeded on its own initiative. See Freeman & Spence, supra; see also Energy Policy
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
49. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 829.
50. Id. at 830. Whether RTOs have in fact produced all these gains remains a matter of scholarly
debate. See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28
ENERGY L.J. 147, 148 (2007) (“Broadly speaking, analyses by RTOs and industry consultants trumpet
benefits to consumers in the billions of dollars, while academics have generally come to the opposite
conclusion.”).
51. See Order 2000, supra note 11, 828–29.
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necessary to facilitate deregulation within the electricity sector, the peculiar form
that regional grid governance has taken was not inevitable.52 To the contrary, this
form was one manifestation of the privatization movement that swept the U.S.
administrative state around this time.53 Understanding RTOs as a part of this shift
in bureaucratic theory and practice helps to contextualize the challenges of RTOs
as interrelated with broader critiques of the privatization movement.
By the time FERC formed RTOs, there was strong bipartisan agreement
that government should deregulate where it could and run more like a business
where it could not.54 Academics from libertarians to progressives championed
ideas of “new governance” that would “dislocate traditional state-produced
regulation from its privileged place” and replace it “with a more participatory
and collaborative model, in which government, industry, and society share
responsibility for achieving policy goals.”55 Strategies to accomplish this
collaboration included transferring responsibilities to “private businesses and
nonprofit organizations” that could engage in “audited self-regulation.”56 These
theories of reinventing government57 resulted in a host of new quasigovernmental, hybrid, or boundary organizations operating at the border
between government and the private sector.58

52. See, e.g., infra Part IV (describing alterations and alternatives to the current governance
regime).
53. I use “privatization” broadly, as others have, to indicate the use of private actors to carry out
state responsibilities. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 106.
54. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 31 (2011) (describing the intellectual
lineage of “New Public Management”); MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 79–118 (tracing the decades of
thinking and practice that led to this bi-partisan consensus). See also Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (describing regulation as being
widely “under attack . . . as inefficient, ineffective, and undemocratic”). U.S. theories along these lines
owe much to earlier British experiments. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 9596 (describing Thatcher’s
privatization program); MARY M. TIMNEY, POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: PROTECTING STATES’ ENERGY
POLICY INTERESTS IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 99–100 (2004) (describing this lineage).
55. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344, 345–46, 350 (2004) (describing the contours
of the “new governance” movement and its bipartisan support). See also Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 53–61 (2011)
(outlining the movement towards “minimalism” and “experimentalism”); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 418 (2006) (describing
“[t]he new lexicon of government management” including “‘privatization,’ ‘public and private
partnerships,’ ‘deregulation,’ ‘downsizing,’ and ‘self-regulation’”).
56. Lobel, supra note 55, at 345; see Verkuil, supra note 55, at 399 (underlining the rapid growth
in the “number of private contractors doing the work of government”).
57. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
58. See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 1–8 (2006); KOSAR, supra note
54, at ii (“These hybrid organizations . . . have grown in number, size, and importance in recent
decades.”); David H. Guston, Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An
Introduction, 26 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 399, 400–02 (2001); Anne Joseph O’Connell,
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In the case of electricity, scholars and regulators agreed that complete
deregulation was impossible. The transmission grid retains natural monopoly
characteristics because it is inefficient for multiple companies to duplicate
transmission lines in a single locale.59 Moreover, the grid must maintain a perfect
balance between supply and demand of electrons at all times.60 Therefore, some
regulatory entity had to oversee the modern grid—and one can see fingerprints
of these privatization theories throughout FERC’s design of RTOs.61
FERC’s particular brand of privatization took the following form: the
agency issued an order asking utilities to join RTOs, accompanied by a stern,
parental-style plea: “[W]e expect jurisdictional utilities to form RTOs. If the
industry fails to form RTOs under this approach, the Commission will reconsider
what further regulatory steps are in the public interest.”62 To entice utilities to
join, FERC left the design details up to the industry. The Commission merely
offered a list of required “characteristics” and “functions” that RTOs must have.
Most centrally, it required that RTOs be (1) independent, (2) regional, and (3)
responsible for the operation of the grid.63 To meet these characteristics, FERC
specified that RTOs must be given authority to design and administer their own
regional tariffs, which would establish rules for regional transmission
management.64
Understanding this tariff authority is critical to understanding the power
dynamics between FERC and RTOs. FERC oversees these tariffs as utility rate
filings under Federal Power Act section 205, which requires the agency to play
a “passive and reactive role” by approving any RTO filing that it determines will
result in “just and reasonable” rates.65 In contrast, for FERC or any other entity
Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 842 (2014); Harold Seidman, The Quasi World
of the Federal Government, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1988, at 23.
59. See Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and in Practice: Electricity Distribution
and Transmission Networks, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED? 291 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014).
60. Nevertheless, FERC explicitly credits deregulatory theories as the driving force behind
reforms precipitating the creation of RTOs. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 813–15 (discussing
restructuring as impetus); ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 2 (2007); Boyd, supra
note 13, at 1661–64.
61. Many prominent energy policy scholars also advocated for this format. See, e.g., WILLIAM
W. HOGAN, CARRIE CULLEN HITT & JANELLE SCHMIDT, HARV. ELEC. POL’Y GRP., GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES FOR AN INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR (ISO) 2 (1996) (noting “significant
advantages” to the ISO approach to electricity management); Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring,
Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSPS. 119, 121 (1997).
62. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811.
63. Id. at 842. FERC clarified that, by “independent,” it meant independent from “market
participants.” Id.
64. Id. at 858.
65. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008);
NRG Power Mktg. v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that “Section 205 puts
FERC in a passive and reactive role”) (internal quotations omitted). See also Dworkin & Goldwasser,
supra note 9, at 577 (noting the contentiousness of RTO section 205 filing rights); James et al., supra
note 30, at 3 (labeling the “different burdens of proof between Section 205 and 206” as “critical”).
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to force a change in an RTO’s (or a utility’s) rates, FERC must act under section
206, whether on its own motion or in response to a complaint. The higher burden
of proof in section 206 requires FERC to demonstrate that the current rates are
“entirely outside the zone of reasonableness.”66 Thus, having section 205 filing
authority gives RTOs particular influence over regional rules.67
When encouraging RTOs, FERC declined to mandate any particular
regional boundaries, ownership structure, or organizational form. Thus, FERC
allowed for both for-profit and not-for-profit RTOs and left open the rules
regarding independent board composition.68 FERC also demurred as to the role
that states should play within RTO governance, allowing regional negotiations
to establish the role of these government regulators.69
Essentially, then, FERC contracted out the oversight of regional grid
management to private, industry-led, voluntary clubs. In the words of several
FERC contemporaries, these clubs were “quintessentially American” in their
“democratic” approach to industry regulation, relying “on checks and balances
among all industry segments to help prevent unfair advantages.”70 To be sure,
this was not classic contracting-out, where the government signed away its preexisting duties to a private contractor.71 It was a more nuanced form of
outsourcing, where a new, private intermediary was created to interface between
traditional public utilities and their federal regulator. You could call it, in the
words of Jon Michaels, “millennial privatization”72 or treat it as a product of
“new governance” theory.73 You could call RTOs hybrid or quasi-governmental
organizations,74 self-regulatory organizations,75 or more provocatively, “legal

66. NRG Power Mktg., 862 F.3d at 114 n.2 (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871,
875 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 7–8.
67. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 577.
68. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 847–48, 857.
69. See id. at 848–49, 858, 910.
70. O’Neill et al., supra note 45, at 23.
71. On the prevalence of contracting out during this time, see GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229,
1233 (2003).
72. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 18, 105–10 (using this term to cover the more diffuse,
unusual styles of privatization that emerged during the 1990s).
73. See, e.g., Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 14, 15 (Lester
M. Salamon ed., 2002) (describing arrangements that “defy” traditional precepts of the public/private
divide as “new governance,” a theory rooted in collaboration between the public and private spheres).
74. See SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 22 (“[L]ike utilities, RTO’s operate transmission grids, but
like regulators, RTO’s oversee markets, impose penalties, and are tasked with balancing stakeholder
concerns.”); Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 234 (describing RTOs as boundary organizations and
policy-making bodies); see also Ronald C. Moe, The Emerging Federal Quasi Government: Issues of
Management and Accountability, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 290, 291 (2001) (“The truth is that the quasi
government, virtually by its name alone and the intentional blurring of its boundaries, is not definable
in any precise way.”).
75. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
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cartels.”76 The nomenclature is much debated but not that central for my
purposes.
It is not clear whether FERC could have chosen a structure other than the
private-club RTO model, given how popular these new forms of collaborative,
industry-driven governance had become among both political parties.77
Moreover, there was the dubious matter of legal authority: several states and
utilities suggested FERC would overreach its jurisdiction were it to make RTO
membership mandatory.78 FERC equivocated on this point, reserving judgment
on whether it could mandate the establishment of RTOs.79 Ultimately,
congressional opposition killed the idea, rendering the jurisdictional question
moot for the time being.80
FERC also explicitly celebrated the creation of voluntary RTOs on new
governance grounds, explaining that RTOs would “facilitate lighter handed
regulation.”81 On this score, FERC’s optimism had some support in institutional
theory. Perhaps the closest institutional analog to RTOs is the world of “selfregulatory organizations” (SROs), which is best theorized within securities
law.82 In analyzing the propriety of financial SROs, legal scholars have found
that these organizations work best when: market participants have incentives to
self-police;83 the interests of regulators and market participants align;84 technical
expertise within the industry is critical to effective rulemaking;85 and potential
victims of wrongdoing are within the industry and are not weak or vulnerable.86

76. Martin O’Malley, Ex-Maryland Gov O’Malley: States Must Reassert Authority on Clean
Energy Policy, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ex-maryland-govomalley-states-must-reassert-authority-on-clean-energy-po/551461
[https://perma.cc/YUG84WLF].
77. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 104–05.
78. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 831–33, 838–40.
79. See id. at 840 n.162 (“We need not decide in this case the extent of the Commission’s
authority to mandate generically RTO participation.”).
80. See Clinton A. Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?,
27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 75–76 (2006).
81. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 811, 830.
82. As Saule Omarova describes, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the
registered stock exchanges “operate under strict oversight by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and direct their activities primarily at managing, often in excruciating detail, the everyday
business of securities broker-dealers and other market intermediaries”—making them relatively similar
in institutional positioning to RTOs. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward
Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 417 (2011); see William A. Birdthistle &
M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2013); James J. Park, Rules,
Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012); Cary
Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael & Thomas J. Healey, The Role of Government
in Corporate Governance, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 219 (2004).
83. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 8; Park, supra note 82, at 144; Omarova,
supra note 82, at 416.
84. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 26.
85. Id. at 56; Omarova, supra note 82, at 433; Coglianese et al., supra note 82, at 224.
86. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 26.
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At RTOs’ inception, the electricity industry arguably had many of these
characteristics. RTOs’ primary charge—establishing rules for the efficient use
of the interconnected transmission grid—would benefit all industry participants
and consumers, as almost everyone bought or sold some outside power by this
point.87 FERC likely also perceived any potential victims of discriminatory RTO
practices as limited to sophisticated industry players, given that RTOs would
regulate wholesale transactions between independent generators and utilities.
Perhaps most critically, FERC perceived the initial scope of RTO
governance as limited, designed to tap into the industry’s particular expertise
without threatening to usurp the regulator’s role.88 Because RTOs grew out of
power pools and independent system operators, industry control of this more
robust form of regional collaboration likely seemed unthreatening.89 RTOs were
merely an expansion of these pre-existing, technocratic bodies. In accordance
with this vision, one former FERC staffer explained that FERC thought that RTO
stakeholder governance processes would be limited to fights about “whether bids
for electricity for the next day should be due at 2 p.m. or 4 p.m.”90
As the next section will describe, things have turned out quite differently.
In part through FERC initiatives, and in part through RTO-led mission
expansion, RTOs have come to have a consequential role in dictating the terms
of U.S. energy infrastructure investment, with ramifications that reach far
beyond internal industry players.91 At the same time, the rise of climate change
as a policy priority has created increasing divergence between the priorities of
industry incumbents and their state and federal regulators—thus changing
substantially the calculus of self-regulation.
II.
RTOS’ ADOLESCENCE: A MESSY PERIOD OF GROWTH
The previous Section focused on RTOs’ creation. This Section describes
how this grid governance experiment has evolved during two decades of
implementation, focusing on two key developments: (1) RTO stakeholder
governance arrangements and (2) growth in RTO responsibilities. The Section
then explains how the courts and Congress have complicated FERC’s efforts to

87. See Order 888, supra note 44, at 21,594 (noting the “industry’s interest (which we share) in
the . . . potential for an ISO to provide non-discriminatory transmission services . . . .”).
88. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 555 (suggesting that FERC valued RTOs’ “onthe-ground knowledge”).
89. See Boyd, supra note 13, at 1663 (outlining history behind RTOs); Dworkin & Goldwasser,
supra note 9, at 554 (noting that several RTO functions were previously performed “on a multi-company
basis through power pools, including those which, like the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), were
described as ‘tight’ power pools because they had significant control over dispatch and transmission
scheduling on an operational basis”).
90. Telephone Interview with Former FERC Staffer (Mar. 28, 2019) (notes on file with author,
anonymity granted due to continued role in industry).
91. See infra Part II.C.
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manage RTOs, through precedent and legislative changes that impoverish both
regulatory accountability and intra-industry competition.
A. The Spectrum of Regional Responses
FERC’s efforts to create a uniform model of grid governance were
unsuccessful. Order 2000’s parental-style plea to form RTOs allowed utilities
either to file a proposal for an RTO or else “a description of efforts to participate
in an RTO.”92 Some regions—particularly those that already had an ISO—
quickly acquiesced to RTO formation.93 In contrast, utilities in the South and the
West (aside from California), two regions with historically low power prices,
resisted regionalization.94 In light of these mixed results, in 2002, FERC issued
notice of plans to exercise a heavier parental hand by forcing all regions to adopt
a Standard Market Design.95 But again, utilities in non-RTO regions balked, and
states resisted FERC’s perceived jurisdictional power grab.96 And so FERC
backpedaled. In 2005, it officially terminated its proposed rule, declining to
enforce a single model across the United States electricity sector.97
Accordingly, the United States is left with a hodge-podge system: official
RTOs in four regions; smaller ISOs that function equivalently to RTOs in two
regions; and no central regional grid coordinator in the remainder of the country
(see Figure 1).98 Today, two-thirds of the country (measured by population) is
under an RTO/ISO, but not all of the scale FERC desired.99

92. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 812.
93. FERC approved some of these pre-existing ISOs as RTOs; others it rejected as being not
regional enough in scope (for this reason, New York’s and California’s ISOs have never been officially
designated as RTOs). See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 96 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,184 (July 12, 2001);
ISO New England, Inc., 106 FERC ¶ 61,280, 62,023 n.8 (Mar. 24, 2004); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 106
FERC ¶ 61,242, 61,855 (Mar. 9, 2004).
94. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 935–36.
95. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,455, 55,458 (July 31, 2002) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) (describing RTO formation process as too slow and uncertain); id. at 55,564
(describing required markets).
96. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S STANDARD
MARKET DESIGN ACTIVITIES 3 (2003) (noting widespread state opposition).
97. See Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,140–02, 43,140–41 (July 26, 2005).
98. See generally William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) (describing the three different
models of state electricity regulation). Texas also has an RTO, but its grid is not connected interstate and
thus is not under federal jurisdiction. See id. at 855.
99. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 3.
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Figure 1. RTOs and ISOs by Region100

B. The Modern RTO: Stakeholder Governance
As RTOs took shape in the early 2000s, critics worried that their early
governance design was too responsive to the concerns of volunteer member
utilities and insufficiently protective of the public interest.101 To respond to these
concerns, FERC focused on shoring up the internal stakeholder process used to
inform RTO decision-making. In 2008, FERC ordered each RTO to demonstrate
that its stakeholder processes met specified “responsiveness” criteria, intended
to “establish a means for customers and other stakeholders to have a form of
direct access to the board of directors, and thereby to increase the boards of
directors’ responsiveness to these entities.”102 But here again, FERC deferred to
RTOs to shape their own processes. The result of this deference has been a
profusion of dense, convoluted RTO stakeholder governance processes, each
with its own quirks (for details, see Appendix A).103 To provide a flavor of RTO
governance today, I offer below sketches of the internal governance
machinations of the two most divergent RTOs: PJM and California.

100. RTOs and ISOs, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos [https://perma.cc/9497-EP3B].
101. See FERC Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity
Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order
719]; Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 543, 547–48; Klevorick, supra note 28, at 309.
102. Order 719, supra note 101, at 64,154.
103. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14.
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1. Big and Bold: PJM’s Membership-Driven RTO Governance
PJM (originally named for Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland, but now
encompassing portions of thirteen states and Washington, D.C.) is the biggest
and perhaps the boldest of RTO governance experiments. However, the broad
outlines of its governance practices are representative of most RTOs other than
California.104 PJM is technically a limited liability company but has no assets of
its own, so it functions like a not-for-profit.105 The company is governed by a
nine-member, independent board of directors106 elected by the Members
Committee, which is the senior governing committee of PJM.107 Each member
of PJM gets one vote at the Members Committee, where decisions are taken by
weighted sectoral voting to ensure that no market sector dominates the others
through sheer number of participants.108 To become a voting member, one must
apply and demonstrate an ownership interest in one PJM sector: transmission
owner, generation owner, other supplier, electric distributor, or end-use
customer.109 The key entities charged with protecting consumer interests—statelevel consumer advocates—are simply lumped in with end-use customers for
purposes of voting, giving them limited power within these proceedings.110 Other
stakeholders can still participate in RTO meetings, but hold no voting sway.111
In a move that sets PJM apart from other RTOs, it has split its section 205
filing rights—recall, those are the rights to petition FERC for any “just and
reasonable” change to operating rules—between the Members Committee and
the PJM Board, each of which controls changes to certain markets and other
topics within the region.112 Issues reach the consideration of the Members
Committee through internal lower committees.113 For most issues, the Members
Committee requires a two-thirds weighted vote to pass an issue on either to the

104. See E4THEFUTURE, supra note 30, at 3, 6.
105. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 552 n.43 (explaining that PJM operates at a
“zero profit margin”) (internal quotations omitted). All other RTOs are non-profit. Id. at 552.
106. Independence here is defined by FERC as lacking financial or personal interest in market
participants. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 842.
107. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 9.
108. In PJM, each sector gets an equal weight in voting—that is, 20 percent, since there are five
sectors. See id. at 10.
109. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 6; SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 10.
110. See Doing Business with PJM FAQs, PJM, https://learn.pjm.com/pjmstructure/governance/doing-business-with-pjm-faqs/what-are-the-categories-of-pjm-membership.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Y6KR-RNZ3].
111. See James et al., supra note 30, at 2.
112. PJM’s Board holds filing rights over the region’s capacity market, among other issues,
whereas the Members Committee controls the operating agreement, which governs energy and ancillary
service markets. See Order of Proposed Tariff Revisions, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶
61,208, 62,297 n.3 (June 9, 2015).
113. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 9–10. “User groups” provide an additional means of bringing
an issue before the Members Committee. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14.
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PJM Board or to FERC.114 Of course, any member or other stakeholder is free to
propose changes under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, but the member
then has the burden of demonstrating to FERC that the existing rules are “unjust
and unreasonable.”115
Two other features of PJM governance deserve mention because of their
advisory powers: the role of the market monitor and the role of the states. FERC
requires RTOs to engage independent market monitors to ensure that no firm
exercises market power to manipulate market rules for private gain.116 In PJM,
an independent firm named Monitoring Analytics provides this service and
makes annual reports and recommendations on the state of PJM’s market
performance.117 However, PJM does not have to adopt the recommendations
made by its market monitor, and researchers suggest that less than half of
Monitoring Analytics’ recommendations made to PJM between 1999 and 2015
were ever adopted.118
PJM—like all multi-state RTOs—also has a regional state committee,
which is known as the Organization of PJM States, Inc., or OPSI.119 A public
utility commission representative from each state within PJM’s footprint (as well
as D.C.—no taxation without representation here) serves as part of OPSI. But
OPSI’s role is limited to influence: OPSI “liaises with PJM and monitors
proposals impacting state interests,” but has no formal role in PJM decisionmaking structures.120
PJM’s modern governance structure thus consists of a complex
arrangement of shared power between an independent board and RTO members,
who jointly hold power over a plethora of grid management decisions. Most RTO
governance processes operate similarly to PJM—with some divergence in the
role of the states’ committee, the composition of membership sectors, and the

114. SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 10; Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 30, at 129 (“[T]he [Members
Committee] can bypass the PJM board and make filings directly with FERC by exercising its filing
rights, although it seldom does so.”) (internal citation omitted).
115. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
116. See Order on Compliance Filing, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 129 FERC ¶ 61,250, 62,378
(Dec. 18, 2009); SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 28. See also Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 571–
77 (discussing role of and challenges facing market monitors); Spence & Prentice, supra note 28, at 132
(2012) (observing shift from regulatory focus on controlling market power to preventing market
manipulation).
117. See
MONITORING
ANALYTICS,
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/home/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/HK7T-WH63].
118. See SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 28. See also Hartman, supra note 8 at 15 (“Market-design
problems whose fixes are unpopular with key market stakeholders still go unresolved for extended
periods . . . .”).
119. ORG. OF PJM STATES, INC., https://opsi.us [https://perma.cc/3BFH-7BYC]. See also
William H. Smith, Jr., Formation and Nurture of a Regional State Committee, 28 ENERGY L.J. 185,
196–98 (2007) (detailing the creation of MISO’s regional state committee).
120. Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 13.
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parsing of section 205 filing rights.121 One region, however, differs dramatically
and thus merits exploration at greater length.
2. Keeping it Close: California’s State-Led ISO Governance
California is a complex case study when it comes to electricity, given that
its fiascos in the early days of deregulation remain energy law’s most prominent
cautionary tale (although the state’s 2019 blackouts to avoid wildfires may give
this superlative a run for its money).122 Most commentators have concluded that
private manipulation of the state’s nascent state electricity markets played a
substantial role in these early crises, although market design flaws and weather
conditions also contributed.123 In light of this history, it is not coincidental that
California lawmakers have chosen to maintain substantial state control over their
ISO, and have thus imbued it with a markedly different governance structure.124
California created its ISO—nicknamed CAISO—as part of its 1995
restructuring of the state’s electricity system.125 After considerable adjustments
to the ISO’s initial design, California arrived at its modern ISO structure in the
early 2000s. CAISO has a five-member board, appointed by the Governor of
California with approval of the Senate.126 Its decision-making operates similarly
to “the standard administrative process of a government agency”: CAISO staff
draft white papers or straw proposals for addressing identified problems, take
comments from interested parties, and then send the final proposal to the CAISO
Board of Governors to be voted on.127 The Board is in charge of submitting any
proposed tariff changes to FERC.128 That means that politically accountable

121. See infra Part V and Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14.
122. On the electricity crisis, see, for example, Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale:
Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REGUL. 471 (2002); Frank A. Wolak,
Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, ELEC. J., Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 11. See also Order
Conditionally Accepting the California Independent System Operator’s Electric Tariff Filing to Reflect
Market Redesign and Technology Upgrade, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,274,
62,124 (Sept. 21, 2006) (describing thirty reforms to California’s market over a six-year period to “avoid
the mistakes of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001”). On the recent blackouts and wildfires, see
Power Lines Are Still Starting California Wildfires. We Can’t Wait Three Years for a Fix, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-29/fix-california-wildfiresutlities-and-fire-starting-power-lines
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-29/fix-californiawildfires-utlities-and-fire-starting-power-lines].
123. See Duane, supra note 122, at 507–17.
124. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that California’s single state structure allows
it to give “considerably more influence to state political entities, such as the California Public Utilities
Commission and the California Energy Commission, than is generally the case in ISOs”).
125. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Proposed Policies Governing
Restructuring California’s Electric Service Industry and Reforming Regulation, 64 C.P.U.C. 2d 1, 95
(Dec. 20, 1995).
126. James et al., supra note 30, at 67.
127. E4THE FUTURE, supra note 30, at 10 (“There is no official membership structure in CAISO
and there are no limitations on who can be a stakeholder.”).
128. Id.
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board members hold all of the section 205 filing rights in California, in contrast
to PJM’s split rights between an independent board and a private Members
Committee.129 California’s market monitoring also takes place in-house, through
a Department of Market Monitoring that produces reports, submits comments,
and participates in stakeholder processes.130
Through this RTO structure, California maintains considerable state control
over the priorities and actions of its RTO—in contrast to the largely private
structure of other RTOs. This political control has proven important in its efforts
to decarbonize the grid131—a topic taken up in Part III.
C. The Modern RTO: Expanding Control
As RTOs’ governance has matured, these organizations have also grown in
responsibilities, albeit unevenly across regions. When FERC designed RTOs, the
agency was focused on the challenge of ensuring non-discriminatory access to
privately owned and managed transmission infrastructure. To be sure, FERC
countenanced that RTOs’ role might expand to include administering electricity
markets.132 But the Commission scarcely devoted any early attention to this
topic.
Over time, every RTO has elected to run a set of markets. RTOs administer
markets for the trading of electricity itself and for ancillary services—basically,
all the technical support services needed to ensure reliable delivery of power.133
That means that all RTOs, through their governance processes, must create
eligibility and bidding rules for these markets—a significant responsibility to
bestow upon the incumbent group of market participants.134 FERC has also
steadily expanded RTOs’ role with respect to transmission planning and
transmission cost allocation, and now requires each region to have detailed
129. See Order of Proposed Tariff Revisions, supra note 112, at 62,297 n.3.
130. See
Market
Monitoring,
CAL.
ISO,
http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/MarketMonitoring/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/LZJ5-GCHU].
131. See BENTHAM PAULOS, NEXT 10, A REGIONAL POWER MARKET FOR THE WEST: RISKS
AND BENEFITS 6 (2018) (“CAISO has a strong connection to state policies and coordinates with state
energy and environmental agencies.”).
132. Order 2000, supra note 11, at 913 (instructing RTOs to consider whether establishing a
power exchange would “provide additional benefit in its region”).
133. See ZHI ZHOU, TODD LEVIN & GUENTER CONZELMANN, ARGONNE NAT’L LAB’Y,
SURVEY OF U.S. ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS (2016); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and
Governance of Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 569, 574 (2000) (discussing the need for reserves). CAISO also runs an innovative “energy
imbalance market” in the West, where utilities voluntarily share resources in a short-term market to help
balance loads more efficiently across the region. See Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh,
Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Solan, Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market
in the United States: The Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC.
SCI. 94, 95 (2016).
134. The convoluted mechanisms of “price formation” in these markets are beyond the scope of
this article, given its focus on governance, but are the subject of a detailed and insightful examination in
William Boyd, Ways of Price Making and the Challenge of Market Governance in U.S. Energy Law,
105 MINN. L. REV. 739 (2020).
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procedures for identifying needed transmission grid expansion and apportioning
the costs of such lines among member utilities.135
Moreover, several RTOs have expanded their roles further by assuming
control over “resource adequacy.” Traditionally, states have been in charge of
planning to ensure that adequate generation is constructed to meet anticipated
future electricity demand136—in the industry, this is called ensuring adequate
“capacity.”137 But some regions, including PJM, New England, and New York,
have decided that it makes more sense for capacity to be centrally procured.138
These regions are notable for having far more states that have required
divestment of generation assets, thereby causing a gap in utility-scale planning
for resource adequacy.139 As a remedy, after contentious negotiations and
litigation, these eastern RTOs have instituted centralized, mandatory capacity
markets.140 In these markets, the RTO assigns a capacity obligation to all utilities
in the region that serve end-use customers, and then requires utilities to purchase
adequate capacity (typically three years in advance) through an auction, into
which generation companies bid.141 Thus these administrative “markets,” instead
of state planners, largely determine what resources will receive financing in the
region.142 The layering of capacity markets on top of energy markets has proven
a controversial and unstable element in the eastern RTOs.143

135. See FERC Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 48,845–46 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 1000]. Order 1000 imposes these same transmission obligations
on regions without an RTO. Id.
136. State authority over generation resources is explicit in the Federal Power Act, which
provides that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of
electric energy . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018).
137. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“‘Capacity’ is not electricity itself but the ability to produce it when necessary.”).
138. Otherwise, a regional market may result in a “free rider problem, where some utilities count
on the capacity they expect others to buy in order to support their own reliability.” Id. Many regions
cooperated on capacity long before RTOs/ISOs arrived. See id.; SHARON JACOBS & ARI PESKOE,
GETCHES-WILKINSON CTR., ENERGY EMERGENCIES VS. MANUFACTURED CRISES: THE LIMITS OF
FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT POWER MARKETS 5 (2019); Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9,
at 553.
139. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (showing restructuring status by region).
140. FERC and the courts have sanctioned RTOs’ usage of these markets, but many states feel
that they continue to usurp state authority. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 481
(upholding New England’s capacity market against state claims of RTO jurisdictional overreach); Md.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 632 F.3d 1283, 1284–85 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (similar regarding PJM).
141. I am simplifying my description of capacity markets; for an in-depth exploration, see Order
on Rehearing, Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ 61,229, 61,246 (Nov. 20,
2015); James Bushnell, Michaela Flagg & Erin Mansur, Capacity Markets at a Crossroads 24–31
(Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper No. 278, 2017); Chen & Murnan, supra note 30; Joshua C. Macey
& Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2020).
142. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 5 n.12 (suggesting these are perhaps more accurately
called capacity “constructs,” rather than “markets”).
143. See infra Parts III.B, V.A. See also SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 16 (noting “[c]onstant
changes” to the PJM capacity market construct as a challenge for the region). Many have also critiqued
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In other regions—particularly those where utilities continue to own
substantial generation—responsibility for resource adequacy has not been given
over so thoroughly to RTOs. In California, the state public utility commission
retains control over resource adequacy and plans for future capacity additions.144
MISO—the Midwestern ISO—runs a voluntary capacity market, so that states
can instead direct their utilities to procure long-term contracts or self-supply new
capacity, should they so desire.145 And in the Southwestern Power Pool, resource
adequacy decisions are explicitly reserved for the Regional State Committee—a
compromise negotiated by participating states so as not to abdicate so much of
their power to the RTO.146 As Parts III and IV will describe, the question of who
controls resource adequacy becomes particularly important under conditions of
climate change, because the type of resources added to the grid will make or
break state climate goals, not to mention planetary warming thresholds.
D. The Other Branches Intervene: Wrinkles in RTO Governance
The result of RTOs’ expanded suite of responsibilities is that they are now
the key architects of market structures and market pricing mechanisms for
electricity—and these markets now substantially influence the course of the
sector. When FERC designed these creatures, it presumed that it would be able
to adequately police their development (perhaps, again, a classic parenting
mistake).147 But of course, FERC cannot design governance arrangements in a
vacuum: Congress and the courts often act in ways that affect FERC’s best-laid
plans. This final subsection describes how both judicial and legislative
developments have complicated FERC’s scheme of private grid governance.
1. Doctrinal Limitations on FERC’s Oversight Authority
In the time since RTOs’ inception, a pair of circuit court opinions has
circumscribed FERC’s ability to manage the governance of these regional
entities. The first blow in this regard came shortly after RTOs’ formation. In
2004, FERC decided that California’s method of ISO/RTO board selection148
was insufficiently independent, and therefore ordered the state to choose its

capacity markets as economically inefficient. See Blumsack, supra note 50, at 176 n.79 (gathering
critiques).
144. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 380 (West 2019); CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Resource
Adequacy, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ra [https://perma.cc/8B9X-YH45].
145. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14.
146. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 8.
147. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 578 (quoting former FERC Chairman
Kelliher’s explanation that “RTOs are not self-regulating organizations; they cannot set rules and
enforce rules unilaterally . . . we set and enforce the rules, so we’re ultimately responsible”).
148. Recall that ISOs and RTOs are functionally identical for purposes of this analysis. See supra
note 8.
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board “through a method dictated by FERC.”149 California appealed, and in
2004, the D.C. Circuit held in CAISO v. FERC that FERC has “no authority” to
“order a public utility subject to its regulation to replace its governing board.”150
Although FERC claimed this authority under its power to regulate practices
“affecting” jurisdictional rates, the court found it “crystal clear” that “practice”
does not extend to “corporate governance or structure.”151 If it did, the court
reasoned, then what would stop FERC from replacing the board of Duke Energy
tomorrow?152 (Heaven forbid.153) The court explained that the proper remedy for
FERC to use, if CAISO’s board appointment rules threaten the ISO’s
independence, is to revoke approval of the ISO altogether.154
Although CAISO arguably enlarged FERC’s authority to regulate markets
and pricing by cementing the agency’s authority over “practices affecting
rates,”155 it simultaneously narrowed FERC’s authority to regulate RTO
governance itself. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit—reasoning under the text and
structure of the Federal Power Act—rendered obvious a point that much energy
law scholarship seems to gloss over: RTOs are not a special “quasigovernmental” body in the eyes of the law. FERC can oversee their governance
only to the same extent as it can traditional investor-owned utilities. This
formalistic equivalence is at odds with the functional reality of RTOs today,
which operate as policy-making bodies that scarcely resemble traditional
utilities.156
Whereas CAISO limited the scope of RTO practices that FERC can
regulate, a 2017 opinion placed boundaries on FERC’s ability to regulate even
those practices and rates clearly within its jurisdiction. In NRG v. FERC, the D.C.
Circuit considered a challenge to FERC’s longstanding practice of requiring

149. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2004). There is a longer
history of changes in California’s board formation procedures, see id. at 396–98, but I dispense with
these details.
150. Id. at 398.
151. Id. at 399, 400.
152. Id. at 404.
153. See Fred Clasen-Kelly & Sarah Skinner, ‘Taking Care of the People Wasn’t a Priority.’ Is
Duke Energy to Blame for Flooding?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 24, 2019, 5:16 PM),
charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article231820373.html
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article231820373.html];
Herman K. Trabish, Duke Pleads Guilty to Nine Coal Ash Charges Stemming from Dan River Spill,
UTIL. DIVE (May 15, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-pleads-guilty-to-nine-coal-ashcharges-stemming-from-dan-river-spill/398144 [https://perma.cc/4U9Z-YEGM]; David Zucchino,
Duke Energy Fined $102 Million for Polluting Rivers with Coal Ash, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2015, 7:01
PM),
latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-energy-coal-ash-20150514-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150515040125/latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-energy-coal-ash20150514-story.html].
154. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, 372 F.3d at 404. FERC expressed concern about undertaking this
“drastic remedy.” Id.
155. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1832 (2016) (arguing for this reading of CAISO).
156. See infra Part III.
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RTOs to modify their filings to gain regulatory approval under section 205. In
that case, several companies challenged FERC’s modifications to a PJM section
205 filing that adjusted the region’s capacity market.157 The court held, in brief,
that the Commission exceeded its legal authority by requiring more than “minor”
modifications to the RTO’s proposal, even though the RTO had accepted
FERC’s proposed modifications.158
NRG thus further limits FERC’s oversight authority of RTOs, as it means
that FERC must approach RTOs’ proposed tariffs essentially on a “take it or
leave it” basis.159 That’s a big deal in a field where stakeholder negotiations and
board deliberation can drag on for years. Without the ability to propose anything
beyond “minor” modifications, FERC has at its disposal only the drastic remedy
of completely denying an RTO’s long-negotiated proposal, thus leaving to fester
whatever problem the proposal was designed to address.160 The combined effect
of CAISO and NRG, then, is to render FERC unable to reform RTO governance
at the same time that it must wholly accept or reject whatever proposals come
out of RTO governance arrangements.
2. Merger Mania
These doctrinal limitations on FERC’s RTO oversight have been
compounded by legislative developments that have transformed public utilities
themselves. In 2005, Congress repealed the longstanding Public Utilities
Holding Company Act (PUHCA), which since 1935 had prevented mergers
between non-geographically contiguous utilities.161 Since PUHCA’s repeal,
there has been explosive growth in utility mergers—with substantial collateral
consequences for RTO governance.
PUHCA emerged from the crisis in utility holding companies that
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929, which precipitated the Great
Depression.162 During an exhaustive investigation, the Federal Trade
Commission found rampant abuses of the holding company structure, in which
a few major companies controlled vast numbers of smaller utilities and ancillary
businesses.163 The holding companies were accused of running a pyramid
157. NRG Power Mktg. v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
158. Id. at 110, 114.
159. NRG Power Mktg. clarifies that FERC’s role in evaluating section 205 filings is “passive
and reactive.” Id. at 114.
160. Cf. Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Comm’r Glick,
dissenting in part). To be sure, FERC may retain some backroom bargaining authority, but even this is
diminished when an RTO board or RTO stakeholders know that FERC is eager to see changes occur—
since they also know the agency is thus likely to approve whatever proposal the RTO sends its way.
161. See Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018)).
162. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking
Up the Banks That Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 845–46 (2011).
163. See H. R. REP. NO. 827-73 (1934); Karmel, supra note 162, at 849 (describing the main
“evils” the FTC investigation uncovered).
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scheme in which they watered down stock and failed to maintain reasonable debt
to equity ratios.164 PUHCA attempted to limit these practices and protect
investors by eliminating the use of holding companies except in the case of
geographically contiguous utilities, where joint ownership was understood to
bring economies of scale.165 These restrictions followed from the Progressive
philosophy—championed by Louis Brandeis—that giant monopoly holding
companies presented a “[c]urse of [b]igness,” threatening democracy by
eliminating competition and accruing outsized political and economic power.166
Intellectual currents shifted in the second half of the twentieth century, such
that “bigness” no longer reigned as a concern in antitrust law.167 These changes
in antitrust theories are not typically connected with RTOs or the energy sector
because regulated utilities are largely insulated from antitrust challenges.168 But
the movement has nevertheless had dramatic impacts upon the electricity
industry, since the same intellectual trend manifested itself in public utility law
through the demise of PUHCA. Once “bigness” was no longer a concern, the
1935 prohibition on non-contiguous utility mergers lost merit.169 In a 1995
report, the Securities and Exchange Commission found that “the conduct that
gave rise to the Act ha[d] all but disappeared,” and that PUHCA had become a

164. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33739, THE REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA 1935) AND ITS IMPACT ON ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 3 (2006);
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF INV. MGMT., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC-UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANIES 14–15 (1995); Norman S. Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem, 25
CALIF. L. REV. 517, 520–22 (1937); David Ferber, Arthur Blasberg, Jr. & Melvin Katz, Conflicts of
Interest in Reorganization Proceedings Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 322 (1959).
165. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 47 Stat. 1844 § 2(a)(29) repealed by Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018))
(defining “integrated public-utility system” as one “whose utility assets . . . are physically
interconnected . . .”). See also Douglas W. Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935—Fossil
or Foil?, 30 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606, 609 (1977).
166. See Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18; William
A. Gregory & Rennard Strickland, Hugo Black’s Congressional Investigation of Lobbying and the
Public Utilities Holding Company Act: A Historical View of the Power Trust, New Deal Politics, and
Regulatory Propaganda, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 543, 548–49 (1976) (tying PUHCA to the Brandeisian
movement to reign in “bigness”); Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What
is Next for Holding Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (“PUHCA was as much about a desire to
control the corrosive effects of powerful business interests . . . on the democratic process, as it was about
promoting economical and efficient utility service throughout the nation . . . .”).
167. As several scholars have documented, beginning in the 1960s, largely under the intellectual
leadership of Robert Bork, antitrust theory experienced a marked turn. Whereas early courts and scholars
saw antitrust laws as serving a multiplicity of ends, Bork and his progeny asserted that antitrust should
focus exclusively on protection of consumer welfare. As this new interpretation of the goals of antitrust
curried favor in the courts and enforcement agencies, concerns about the “bigness” of corporations as a
problem in and of itself fell away. See WU, supra note 6, at 102–18; Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at
268–74; Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979).
168. See Vaheesan, supra note 28, at 940–42 (collecting circuit court cases holding regulated
utilities exempt from antitrust challenges).
169. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 164, at 60 (rejecting theories
of regulation based on “preconceived notions of size.”).
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“barrier to innovation and competition in the utility industry.”170 In 2005,
Congress did away with PUHCA in its entirety, lifting the substantive
prohibitions on holding companies’ ownership of utilities and other
businesses.171
The repeal resulted in an explosion in utility-sector mergers.172 As of 2016,
there were fifty remaining utility systems, down from hundreds a few decades
earlier.173 In theory, the fact that FERC still must approve utility mergers could
serve as a check on consolidation. But FERC evaluates utility mergers under
Federal Power Act section 203, whose “public interest” standard has been
interpreted to require the agency to ensure only that the merger will do “no harm”
to competition within the industry.174 FERC applies this standard in a piecemeal
and lenient fashion, refusing to examine broader industry impacts in deciding
individual applications.175
Consequently, utility mega-holding companies have returned.176 There is a
certain irony in the fact that deregulatory theories led FERC to turn increasingly
to competition as the basis for ensuring “just and reasonable” rates, while also
leading Congress to lift the prohibitions that had ensured robust competition in
the industry over the previous eighty years.177 To be sure, some utility mergers
create efficiencies through economies of scale or complementary business
ventures.178 But they also create challenges by concentrating economic and
170. Id. at 1, 7, 60. See also CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 164, at 1; Richard L. Gordon, The
Public Utility Holding Company Act: The Easy Step in Electric Utility Regulatory Reform, 15 REGUL.
58, 58 (1992) (“PUHCA is an act of questionable original value and clear current redundancy. It should
be totally repealed.”); Lawrence J. Spiwak, Expanding the FERC’s Jurisdiction to Review Utility
Mergers, 14 ENERGY L.J. 385, 385 (1993) (describing “heavy criticism” of PUHCA during the early
1990s).
171. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, §§ 1261–77 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2018)); FERC Order No. 667, Repeal of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 and Enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005, 70
Fed. Reg. at 75,592 (Dec. 20, 2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 365–66 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 667]
(implementing new reporting requirements).
172. See Jack Azagury, Walt Shill & Ted Walker, The Race to Consolidate, PUB. UTILS.
FORTNIGHTLY MAG., (Sept. 2012), https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/09/race-consolidate
[https://perma.cc/A62H-A5Q6] (“[I]n the past 18 months alone we have seen a greater growth in the
concentration of the top players in the industry than in the preceding 10 years.”); Melnyk & Lamb, supra
note 166, at 1–2 (explaining that until PUHCA’s repeal, utility acquisitions were limited “principally”
by the statute).
173. Scott Hempling, Inconsistent with the Public Interest: FERC’s Three Decades of Deference
to Electricity Consolidation, 39 ENERGY L.J. 233, 251 n.32 (2018).
174. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2018); Hempling, supra note 173, at 239.
175. See Hempling, supra note 173, at 308–09.
176. See id. at 233.
177. Indeed, Sandeep Vaheesan has pointed out that Alfred Kahn, one of the godfathers of
competition in the electricity industry, “stressed the importance of antitrust enforcement in deregulated
markets” to ensure competition. Vaheesan, supra note 28, at 923 n.2.
178. See, e.g., Raymond S. Hartman, The Efficiency Effects of Electric Utility Mergers: Lessons
from Statistical Cost Analysis, 17 ENERGY L.J. 425, 427–31 (1996) (discussing historical utility mergers
that increased the size of generating units “to capture increasing returns to scale, thereby lowering
average generation costs,” and developing factors that may allow more modern utilities to capitalize
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political power in a small number of companies—not least for theories of RTO
governance, which rely upon internal industry checks to legitimate RTO
decision-making.179 These internal checks presume opposing interests that do not
exist because holding companies have consolidated across demand- and supplyside affiliates.
The holding company resurgence appears even more problematic when one
looks at patterns of infrastructure investment. In 2018, independent power
producers owned 87% of solar and wind energy developments in the United
States, whereas regulated utilities owned only 13%.180 Post-PUHCA, holding
companies can own both these categories of business. But they have increasingly
concentrated their interests within the regulated utility space: at the end of 2018,
independent power entities made up less than 12% of their overall portfolios,
whereas regulated utilities comprised nearly 69%.181 That means that the largest
utility holding companies have interests predominantly opposed to renewable
energy development. Moreover, many companies focused on independent power
production concentrate their fossil fuel holdings within certain RTOs, giving
them a vested interest in shaping particular regions’ market rules.182
Part IV will consider in more detail how merger activity undercuts the
theories behind RTOs’ governance design. First, it is time to examine how
RTOs’ privatized stakeholder model of governance—expanded over time to
include market administration and resource adequacy under shrinking doctrinal
oversight—plays out on matters of substantive import in modern grid
governance.
III.
RTOS CONFRONT THE CLIMATE IMPERATIVE
Perhaps it is just dumb bad luck—but it may be less coincidental—that the
formation of RTOs and mounting policy concern over anthropogenic climate

upon economies of scale). But see Hempling, supra note 173, at 234, 238 (pointing out that mergers can
also create “diseconomies of scale due to non-integrated operations”).
179. Hempling, supra note 173, at 238, 271. See also infra Part III.
180. Calculations derived from data in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL
2018, tbls. 3.2.B. & 3.3.B. (2019), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK6N-X63L].
181. EDISON ELEC. INST., 2018 FINANCIAL REVIEW: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. INVESTOROWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 37.
182. For example, Calpine, the independent power production company driving anti-renewable
reforms in PJM, see infra Part III.C, owns considerable renewable generation in the western United
States, but over 99% of its eastern holdings are concentrated in natural gas. See Our Fleet, CALPINE,
https://www.calpine.com/operations/power-operations/our-fleet
[https://perma.cc/AF5U-T9YB].
NRG, another independent power proponent of anti-renewable reforms in eastern markets, similarly
owns predominantly natural gas resources in the east. See Leading the Nation with an Integrated Power
Plant Portfolio, NRG, https://www.nrg.com/generation/asset-map.html [https://perma.cc/QT9JKNC4].
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change share a similar timeline.183 Consequently, RTOs have had to adapt to an
energy law landscape that has embraced a shifting set of priorities since the early
2000s. As described in this Section, RTO governance has increasingly resisted
these changed priorities, especially when they threaten incumbent members of
the energy sector. However, not all RTOs have struggled equally, suggesting that
certain governance models may be better suited to the climate change era.184
A. The Link Between Grid Governance and Climate Change
The electricity sector has been appropriately called the “linchpin of efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,” central to “[v]irtually all credible
pathways to climate stabilization.”185 For decarbonization to succeed, the U.S.
transportation and heating sectors will need to electrify—creating both
opportunities and pressure for the electricity sector to scale up and clean up at
the same time.186 Most experts agree that the United States’ electricity sector
needs to run on 100 percent clean energy by 2050, if not earlier, to achieve
internationally established climate change goals.187 Despite renewables’ recent
growth, there is a long way to go to reach these kinds of numbers.188 In 2019,
fossil fuels produced 63% of U.S. electricity (with coal at 23.5% and natural gas
at 38.5%)—while nuclear energy produced 19.7%, hydropower and wind each
produced around 7%, and solar energy produced only 1.8%.189
As grid managers, RTOs play a key role in enabling sectoral
transformation. This role is complicated, however, by the fact that neither FERC

183. The signature global climate convention—the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change—was signed in 1992, and the follow-on Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Feb. 16, 2005, 2303
U.N.T.S. 162; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107. If one sees rising emissions and deregulation as products of the same neoliberal economic
agenda, then their contemporaneous timing appears to be part of a concerted effort toward economic
growth at all costs. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE
CLIMATE (2014) (linking these challenges); ANDREAS MALM, FOSSIL CAPITAL: THE RISE OF STEAM
POWER AND THE ROOTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 393 (2016) (arguing that climate change is a “lifting of
the veil on two centuries of fossil capital . . .”).
184. See infra Part V.
185. Jesse D. Jenkins, Max Luke & Samuel Thernstrom, Getting to Zero Carbon Emissions in
the Electric Power Sector, 2 JOULE 2498, 2498 (2018).
186. See Alexandra B. Klass, Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid
to Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47 ENV’T. L. REP. 10,749, 10,751 (2017) (explaining that to reach
“deep decarbonization,” electricity generation “would need to approximately double . . . by 2050 while
its carbon intensity is reduced to 3-10% of its current level”). See also Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at
2,506.
187. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185 (metareview of forty studies of such “deep
decarbonization”). Of course, if the United States alone decarbonized, it would not avoid these
consequences—that requires a larger diplomatic effort.
188. See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable
Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10,591, 10,591 (2017).
189. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/K933-VHZ9].
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nor RTOs have an independent mandate to decarbonize.190 Moreover, the
Federal Power Act explicitly leaves decisions over the electric generation mix to
the states.191 For this reason, those within RTOs often describe these
organizations as policy-takers, not policy-makers, in charge of making the
markets and grid function well in light of whatever policies their member states
adopt.192
Adopt they have: in the last two decades, twenty-nine states have required
their utilities to secure an increasing percentage of their electricity from
renewable energy sources;193 every state has put in place laws to encourage
efficiency and conservation;194 and many states have adopted a range of tax
incentives, special pricing arrangements, and other laws to help promote rooftop
solar, energy storage, electric vehicles, offshore wind, and other promising
decarbonization technologies.195 More recently, a spate of states has upped the
ambition of their renewable targets, aiming to reach 100 percent clean electricity
generation by 2040–2050—with many more considering similar legislation.196
To reach these goals will require the affirmative support of “policy-taking”
RTOs.197 RTOs will have to adjust their markets and dispatch to accommodate
the expected influx of renewable energy. Wind and solar are variable
resources—they only produce energy when the wind is blowing or the sun is
shining.198 To integrate these resources, RTOs will have to reform their systems
to better model renewable energy’s output; reward other sources for being

190. Most commentators accept that decarbonization is not within FERC’s charge to maintain
“just and reasonable” rates—although some argue that FERC could justifiably incorporate this goal. See,
e.g., Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power
Industry, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 275, 278 (2014) (urging FERC to incorporate environmental
considerations into market design); Eisen, supra note 155, at 1786 (urging FERC to consider adopting
a “carbon adder” to market pricing). For purposes of this article, I accept FERC’s movement in this
direction as unlikely. See Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY
L.J. 1, 5, 30–33 (2019) (explaining FERC’s role as a fuel-neutral regulator that is not in charge of setting
priorities for the generation mix, but can and should accommodate state climate priorities).
191. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018).
192. See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 229 (quoting RTO staffer explaining: “We are a
taker of policy not a maker of policy . . . We don’t create policy. We attempt to interpret policy as handed
to us.”). See also Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, 61,226 (2018)
(FERC insisting that the agency remains resource neutral); Our Three Critical Roles, ISO NEW
ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles [https://perma.cc/XB2A-UWVV].
193. N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD
POLICIES
(2018),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4W7-U3YV].
194. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH.
CTR., https://www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/CM9G-CQ2S].
195. See Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 277, 301–12 (2017). See
also Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 194.
196. See Pyper, supra note 17.
197. I return to contest this RTO self-characterization infra Part III.B.
198. See E. ELA, V. DIAKOV, E. IBANEZ & M. HEANEY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y,
IMPACTS OF VARIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC GENERATION AT MULTIPLE
TIMESCALES 8 (2013).
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available to act as flexible, fast-ramping backups; and better integrate demandside technologies to smooth fluctuations in energy supply.199
At the same time, RTOs will have to support decreased reliance on natural
gas to power the U.S. electricity sector. This objective is politically fraught,
given that companies are building long-lived infrastructure in the natural gas
sector at a rapid clip.200 These companies will not easily relinquish the value of
these assets, yet this infrastructure cannot be used for its useful life if we are to
confront the climate imperative (at least not without substantial advancements in
carbon capture and storage, which is not yet adequately commercialized).201
The expansion of renewable energy will also require construction of a lot
more transmission infrastructure to connect remote solar and wind resources to
population centers.202 In their role as regional transmission planning
coordinators,203 RTOs’ willingness to enable maximum transmission expansion
will help determine the viability of a renewables-heavy electricity sector.
In sum, if the United States is to have any chance at decarbonizing at the
rate necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change,204 then RTOs must play a
pivotal role. The remainder of this section explores how RTOs have responded
as putative “policy-takers” to the climate change priorities established by state
and federal entities.

199. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2507 (explaining need for more “flexible and
responsive” power systems in the future).
200. See Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering:
Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (2018); Chloe Holden,
As Coal Retires in PJM, Why Aren’t Renewables Filling the Vacuum?, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 20,
2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/as-coal-retires-in-pjm-why-arent-renewablesfilling-thevacuum?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletter%20Weekly%20Ro
undup:%20Utility%20Dive%2005-25-2019&utm_term=Utility%20Dive%20Weekender#gs.9dffa9
[https://perma.cc/ES95-S6VY] (describing “PJM’s natural-gas plant building boom”); David
Pomerantz, Duke Energy’s Zero-Carbon Goal Undermined by Massive Gas Rush, ENERGY & POL’Y
INST.
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.energyandpolicy.org/duke-energy-net-zero-carbon
[https://perma.cc/AG7J-PCC5] (describing how Duke Energy’s plans to build gas infrastructure are
incompatible with the company’s climate change goals).
201. See CHARLES TEPLIN, MARK DYSON, ALEX ENGEL & GRANT GLAZER, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INST., THE GROWING MARKET FOR CLEAN ENERGY PORTFOLIOS: ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SHIFT FROM NEW GAS-FIRED GENERATION TO CLEAN ENERGY ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 6– 7 (2019) (describing how gas is no longer cost-competitive
with clean energy); William Boyd, supra note 13, at 1624 (discussing this dynamic); Emily Hammond
& Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 645, 647 (2017);
Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2506 (supporting carbon capture and storage as a solution); Serkin &
Vandenbergh, supra note 200, at 1022 (discussing this challenge).
202. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2506; Klass, supra note 186; Alexander E. MacDonald,
Christopher T.M. Clack, Anneliese Alexander, Adam Dunbar, James Wilczak & Yuanfu Xie, Future
Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems and Their Impact on US CO2 Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 526, 526 (2016).
203. See infra Part III.B for more detail.
204. See Jenkins et al., supra note 185, at 2498.
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B. RTOs as Heel-Draggers
On the whole, RTOs are inveterate stallers when it comes to integrating
new resources that would improve their markets but threaten incumbents’ bottom
line. This is not a minor flaw: RTO heel-dragging causes years, if not decades,
of delay in critical market improvements, costing billions of dollars and causing
significant greenhouse gas emissions.205 It is perverse that our key grid
operators—ostensibly created to improve competition and efficiency—should
have to be forced, through years-long processes, to make design improvements
that benefit consumers and the environment.
RTOs’ dilatory tactics have manifested in several technically dense
controversies, which I outline here only in broad strokes. (Indeed, likely one of
the reasons that RTOs get away with these delays is that these topics are so
complicated that they confound efforts at media attention or civic engagement.)
The first such controversy is over what is known as demand response. Currently,
most customers pay a per-kilowatt-hour fee for electricity that does not shift over
the course of the day, week, month, or year—such that their demand fluctuates
mostly in response to the weather and their daily schedules. 206 This causes major
spikes in demand during peak hot and cold periods, and supply must be adequate
to cover these spikes.207 To alleviate the costs of building supply that operates
only at peak periods—and to help integrate more renewables onto the grid—
economists have long called for making electricity demand more responsive to
changes in supply.208 However, demand response is less popular among
transmission and generation owners. Because demand response reduces the
amount of infrastructure that needs to be built, and serves as a balancing resource

205. See STEVE DAHLKE & MATT PROROK, GREAT PLAINS INST., CONSUMER SAVINGS, PRICE,
AND EMISSIONS IMPACTS OF INCREASING DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE MIDCONTINENT ELECTRICITY
MARKET 1 (2018) (finding savings potential from untapped demand response in MISO alone of up to
$18.5 million per year); SAM NEWELL, KATHLEEN SPEES, YINGXIA YANG, ELLIOT METZLER & JOHN
IMON PEDTKE, BRATTLE GRP., OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE EFFICIENTLY MEET SEASONAL CAPACITY
NEEDS IN PJM 2 (2018) (estimating that better accommodating seasonal resources could save consumers
hundreds of millions of dollars each year); JOHANNES P. PFEIFENBERGER, JUDY CHANG, AKARSH
SHEILENDRANATH, J. MICHAEL HAGERTY, SIMON LEVIN & WREN JIANG, BRATTLE GRP., COST
SAVINGS OFFERED BY COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION: EXPERIENCE TO DATE AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR ADDITIONAL CUSTOMER VALUE 1–2 (2019) (estimating that more competitive
transmission processes could create “customer value” of “approximately $8 billion over the course of
five years”); Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM Capacity Market Plan to Increase Costs $8.4B, Market Monitor
Estimates, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/PJM-capacity-market-ferccosts-8billion-risks-state-subsidies-clean-energy-nuclear-mopr/563152
[https://perma.cc/V26ZPTQK].
206. For this reason, most electricity demand is inelastic. A. Faruqui, A. Hajos, R.M. Hledik &
S.A. Newell, Fostering Economic Demand Response in the Midwest ISO, 35 ENERGY 1544, 1544
(2009).
207. Id.
208. See Severin Borenstein, Michael Jaske & Arthur Rosenfeld, Dynamic Pricing, Advanced
Metering, and Demand Response in Electricity Markets 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working
Paper No. 105, 2002); James Bushnell, Benjamin F. Hobbs & Frank A. Wolak, When it Comes to
Demand Response, Is FERC Its Own Worst Enemy?, 22 ELEC. J. 9, 9–10 (2009).
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for renewable resources that may be competing with traditional fossil fuel
resources, these entities see it as a threat to their revenue streams.209
Although FERC has eschewed any specific role as an environmental
regulator, it has embraced demand response as a means of ensuring “just and
reasonable rates.”210 RTOs, though, have on the whole been far less enthusiastic
about integrating demand response. To force RTOs’ hand, FERC in 2008
required RTOs to amend their market rules to “accept bids from demand
response resources, on a basis comparable to any other resources . . . .”211 The
Commission surely hoped that was a job complete. But many RTOs continued
to disadvantage demand response resources by paying less for reductions in
megawatts demanded than was paid to suppliers for providing megawatts.212 To
remedy this deficiency, just three years later FERC had to promulgate another
rule that required RTOs to compensate demand response “at the market price for
energy.”213 Power generators challenged this order in court and the Supreme
Court ultimately upheld it.214

209. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1530–31 (2012).
210. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
594, § 1252(f) (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2624 (2018)) (instructing that “unnecessary barriers to
demand response participation in energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated”);
Order 719, supra note 101, at 64,103 (recognizing the value of demand response in wholesale markets).
211. Order 719, supra note 101, at 64,107 (ancillary services), 64,119 (bidding into energy and
capacity markets), 64,110 (comparability requirement). Before this time, the Commission had issued
several orders related to demand response and had included demand response goals in its failed Standard
Market Design proceeding. See, e.g., Order on Tariff Filing and Complaint, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator,
Inc., N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 92 FERC ¶ 61,073, 61,305 (July
26, 2000) (requiring NYISO to “continue developing a demand-responsive mechanism” to mitigate
price spikes during summer months); Order Accepting in Part and Modifying in Part Standard Market
Design Filing and Dismissing Compliance Filing, New England Power Pool & ISO New England, Inc.,
100 FERC ¶ 61,287, 62,283 (Sept. 20, 2002) (requiring the northeastern market to broaden eligibility
for participation in demand response programs).
212. The particulars of this debate are complex. Economists generally tend to prefer priceresponsive demand, in which consumers naturally respond to price signals by lowering demand, over
incentive payments for demand reduction, which strategically pay consumers for reducing their demand
at certain times. See DAHLKE & PROROK, supra note 205, at 3; Bushnell et al., supra note 208, at 10–
11; Faruqui et al., supra note 206, at 1551. For this reason, some economists questioned the theoretic
propriety of paying demand response providers the same “locational marginal price” as generators. See
FERC Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76
Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 745]
(cataloguing this debate). FERC’s focus, however, was on promoting a maximum amount of demand
response in energy markets and thereby lowering overall system costs—in which case it made sense to
treat demand response providers of “negawatts” the same as generators providing megawatts. See id. at
16,667.
213. Order 745, supra note 212, at 16,658. FERC also imposed a “cost-effectiveness” test to
ensure that demand response was compensated at this level only when it produced “net benefits” for the
system. Id. at 16,659.
214. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775 (2016) (“If rewarded at [locational
marginal price], rather than at some lesser amount, more demand response providers will enter more
bids capable of displacing generation, thus necessarily lowering wholesale electricity prices.”).
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Still, in a tale not unlike the one plaguing women in American
workplaces,215 demand response’s “equal pay for equal work” fight within RTOs
is not over. Additional complex barriers remain across regions.216 At the same
time, new demand-side technologies have emerged that require their own
concerted battles to overcome RTO resistance. In particular, attention has
focused in the last several years on energy storage. Energy storage is often called
the “holy grail” of clean energy efforts because of its ability to balance out
renewable energy supply by storing it during periods of abundance, and releasing
it during periods of under-supply.217
Given these myriad benefits, FERC has been particularly interested in
better integrating storage into energy markets. Certain RTO members, however,
have considerably less interest because storage lessens the need for natural gas.
The natural gas industry argues that it has an important role in a high-renewables
grid, because as a fast-ramping, dispatchable resource, it balances out the
intermittency of renewables.218 But storage can play this same role, emissionsfree—not to mention that it can also reduce and replace transmission and
distribution infrastructure.219 If the storage industry can capitalize upon these
many value streams, it will become a significant threat to incumbent resources.220

215. See Emma Goldberg, Why the Gender Pay Gap Still Persists (and What We Can Do About
It), WASH. POST (May 14, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/14/whygender-pay-gap-still-persists-what-we-can-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/JF47-VSYY]; Pay Equity &
Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-educationeconomic-change/pay-equity-discrimination [https://perma.cc/MQ8T-PVD6].
216. See, e.g., DAHLKE & PROROK, supra note 205, at 2–3 (analyzing why demand response is
underutilized in MISO); Protest of Clean Energy Advocates at 2–3, 17–18, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
FERC Docket No. ER19-1486-000 (May 15, 2019) (contesting PJM’s treatment of demand response in
proposed reforms to reserve pricing); Peter Cappers, Jason MacDonald, Charles Goldman & Ookie Ma,
An Assessment of Market and Policy Barriers for Demand Response Providing Ancillary Services in
U.S. Electricity Markets, 62 ENERGY POL’Y 1031, 1032 (2013) (finding significant barriers remain to
demand response’s participation in ancillary service markets across RTOs); Faruqui et al., supra note
206, at 1546 (similar). The treatment of seasonally available resources remains another challenge. See
Order Dismissing Rehearing and Clarification, Old Dominion Elec. Coop. and Direct Energy Bus. v.
PJM Interconnection, 164 FERC ¶ 61,116, at P 3 (Aug. 17, 2018); Pre-Technical Conference Comments
of NRDC & Sustainable FERC Project at 1–2, Old Dominion Elec. Coop., FERC Docket Nos. EL1732-000, EL17-36-000 (Apr. 11, 2018); NEWELL ET AL., supra note 205, at 2.
217. See, e.g., David Roberts, A Tiny, Beleaguered Government Agency Seeks an Energy Holy
Grail: Long-Term Energy Storage, VOX (Oct. 4, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2018/9/20/17877850/arpa-e-long-term-energy-storage-days
[https://perma.cc/L3E7HTS4] (“If we want to get variable renewable energy up to 60 percent, 80 percent, or even more of our
electricity, we need long-term energy storage. It is the missing puzzle piece, the holy grail.”); Herman
K. Trabish, Energy Storage for the Grid: Better than the Holy Grail, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 7, 2010),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/energy-storage-for-the-grid-better-than-the-holygrail#gs.nyz0g3 [https://perma.cc/LVX4-MWFU].
218. See, e.g., Natural Gas & Renewables: Working Together, INTERSTATE NAT. GAS ASS’N OF
AM., https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=30374&v=b0798882 [https://perma.cc/UM8N-8WFP].
219. See GARRETT FITZGERALD, JAMES MANDEL, JESSE MORRIS & HERVÉ TOUATI, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INST., THE ECONOMICS OF BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE 6 (2015) (diagramming the many
grid services that storage offers).
220. See id.
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For these reasons, FERC again has had to force RTOs into action.221 In
2018, FERC ordered RTOs to create a “participation model” for storage to
remedy unreasonable market barriers that regions have erected.222 But many
RTO responses to the order have been underwhelming, with recent compliance
filings clinging to discriminatory practices.223 For example, PJM’s filing
contained a requirement that storage must be able to run for a minimum of ten
hours to qualify as a Capacity Storage Resource—a requirement the Energy
Storage Association called unnecessary and discriminatory. FERC has since
initiated a paper hearing to determine whether this requirement is warranted.224
None too pleased with these developments, industry incumbents also took
to the courts to stave off storage as a competitor, although with limited success:
in July 2020, the D.C. Circuit quickly dispensed with a challenge brought by
several RTO member utilities and their trade groups that contested FERC’s
jurisdiction to force the participation of storage resources in wholesale
markets.225
More recently, FERC has acted to integrate distributed energy resources
(DER) into markets. DER is a technical term for small-scale generation devices
like rooftop solar panels.226 DER can play a similar role to storage in balancing
energy supply and demand and improving the reliability and efficiency of the
grid, especially when aggregated into larger units that can participate in RTO
221. To be fair, RTOs took steps prior to Order 841 to begin incorporating energy storage into
their markets—but FERC judged these too tepid and scattered. See FERC Order No. 841, Electric
Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators, 83 Fed. Reg. 9580, 9583, 9583 n.14 (Feb. 15, 2018) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35
(2019)) [hereinafter Order 841]. See also James et al., supra note 30, at 18 (observing FERC’s reticence
to force action on the “electric storage resource participation problem”).
222. FERC issued this order under section 206, finding current markets unjust and unreasonable.
Order 841, supra note 221, at 9582.
223. See, e.g., Comments of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law at 2, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., FERC Docket No. ER19-467-000 (Feb. 7, 2019) (critiquing
NYISO for prohibiting dual retail-wholesale participation); Protest of the City of New York at 9, N.Y.
Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., FERC Docket No. ER19-467-000 (Feb. 7, 2019) (critiquing NYISO for
inappropriately trying to extend “buyer-side market power mitigation rules” to include energy storage
and other small resources through its compliance filing).
224. See Order on Compliance Filing, Instituting Section 206 Proceeding, and Establishing Paper
Hearing, PJM Interconnection, LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,049, at P 142 (Oct. 17, 2019).
225. See Nat’l. Ass’n. of Regul. Util. v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“We
swiftly conclude that FERC’s prohibition of state-imposed participation bans directly affects wholesale
rates.”).
226. DER also includes electric vehicles, home energy management systems, fuel cells, and even
electric home water heaters—all of which “are now cost-effective in certain applications.” See MASS.
INST. OF TECH., UTILITY OF THE FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN
TRANSITION 40 (2016). FERC specifically defines DER as “any resource located on the distribution
system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter. These resources may include, but are not
limited to, electric storage resources, distributed generation, demand response, energy efficiency,
thermal storage, and electric vehicles and their supply equipment.” FERC Order No. 2222, Participation
of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organization and Independent System Operators, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247, at P 1 n.1 (Sept. 17, 2020)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2020)) [hereinafter Order 2222].
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markets. 227 DER’s potential in this regard led FERC, in 2020, to issue Order
2222, which requires RTOs to revise their tariffs to allow “distributed energy
resource aggregations” to participate fully in RTO markets.228 FERC had to foist
this reform upon certain of its RTOs, which insisted that in spite of DER’s
significant growth in the last decade and projected “explosive growth” in the
next several years,229 “DER programing must not be done in haste.”230 Again,
then, we see at least some RTOs hesitant to independently advance resources
that could cut emissions and lower prices by reducing the need to build
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. Whether these regions
will respond to FERC’s order with robust reforms remains to be seen, but past
practice leaves room for doubt.231
The final example of RTO heel-dragging that bears mention is transmission
policy. As discussed in Part III.A, building more large-scale transmission will be
key to integrating a large amount of renewable energy into the system.232 To be
fair, RTOs do not bear most of the blame for the challenges plaguing
transmission planning and construction—states, utilities, FERC, certain
environmental groups, Congress, and the courts play major roles.233 But RTOs
have exacerbated the problem by continuing to erect barriers to non-incumbent

227. See Order 2222, supra note 226, at P 5. MIT’s project on the “utility of the future” catalogues
a range of values that DER bring to the grid, including “Energy,” “Network capacity margin,” “Power
quality,” “Reliability and resiliency,” “Black-start,” “Firm generation capacity,” “Operating reserves,”
and “Price hedging” in addition to their environmental and climate change benefits. See MASS. INST. OF
TECH., supra note 226, at 266. On complexities, see Order 841, supra note 221, at 9580 (explaining that
although the agency “continue[s] to believe that removing barriers to distributed energy resource
aggregations in the RTO/ISO markets is important, we have determined that more information is needed
with respect to those proposals . . . ”).
228. See Order 2222, supra note 226, at P 8.
229. See Jeff St. John, Distributed Energy Poised for “Explosive Growth” on the U.S. Grid,
GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 21, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/distributedenergy-poised-for-explosive-growth-on-the-us-grid#gs.os43e7 [https://perma.cc/Q5JE-YFLW].
230. Comments of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., at 2, FERC Docket No.
RM18-9-000 (June 26, 2018); see also Post-Technical Conference Comments of ISO New England Inc.
at 2, FERC Docket No. RM18-9-000 (June 26, 2018) (“ISO-NE does not see a need for an additional
DER participation model in the New England region at this time.”)
231. In the agency’s usual manner, FERC allowed RTOs substantial discretion to decide
precisely how to fairly integrate DER aggregations into their markets. See Order 2222, supra note 226,
at P 7.
232. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
233. There is a large literature on these many challenges. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi,
Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing
State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705 (2010); Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric
Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895
(2015); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable
Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012); Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi,
Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129
(2015); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013); Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National Network Coordinator, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993
(2014); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENV’T
L. 1015 (2009).
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transmission companies competing to build new transmission lines.234 Moreover,
as I have catalogued elsewhere, they have resisted creating planning processes
that weigh “non-transmission alternatives” fairly.235
These examples make clear the extent to which RTOs are obfuscating when
they claim not to be policy-makers. Clearly, the market rules established by RTO
governance processes have profound impacts on which resources power the U.S.
electricity grid. Indeed, as FERC has explained, the reason that markets have
discriminated against demand response, storage, and DER is that barriers “can
emerge when the rules governing participation in those markets are designed
for traditional resources and in effect limit the services that emerging
technologies can provide.”236 Note the passive voice: the barriers just
“emerged.” Such passive problem-creation is the predictable result of a memberdriven process for raising and vetting issues, where incumbents have both reason
and power to block the entry of new competitor technologies.
C. RTOs as Anticompetitive Forces against Renewable Energy
When it comes to demand response, storage, DER, and transmission policy,
RTOs have been slow and tepid. When it comes to renewable energy, certain
RTOs have been aggressive and misguided. Treatment of renewables has been
particularly alarming in ISO New England (ISO-NE) and PJM—two of the
RTOs with mandatory capacity markets.237 These two RTOs have recently
instituted capacity market reforms that make it significantly harder for
renewables to compete in their markets—thereby putting aggressive state
renewable energy goals at risk.
These reforms are tediously complex; for present purposes, I stick to the
basics. These RTOs have asserted that the market participation of resources that
receive “state support” results in “price suppression and thus negatively

234. See, e.g., Order on Initial Decision, TranSource, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 168
FERC ¶ 61,119, at 3–4 (Aug. 26, 2019) (detailing complaints that PJM’s transmission planning unduly
discriminated against merchant transmission projects and ordering some transparency improvements);
CRISTIN LYONS & BRIAN MESSICK, SCOTT MADDEN MGMT. CONSULTANTS, FERC ORDER NO. 1000:
FIVE YEARS ON 3 (2016).
235. See Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 457, 508
(2015).
236. Order 841, supra note 221, at 9582.
237. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. New York has similar concerns. See Complaint
on Behalf of the New York State Public Service Commission and the New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority and Request for Fast Track Processing at 3, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n
v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., FERC Docket No. EL19-86-000 (July 29, 2019) (“The NYISO’s
current [capacity market] rules are used as both a shield to preserve the market position of incumbent
generators and as a sword against new market entrants.”). See also Order Instituting Proceeding and
Soliciting Comments at 3–4, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 19-E-0530 (Aug. 8, 2019). In 2020,
however, FERC declined to allow NYISO to amend its capacity market rules to address these concerns.
See N.Y. System Op., Inc., Order Rejecting Tariff Revisions, Docket No. ER20-1718-001, P 1 (Sept. 4,
2020). See also infra notes 325–327 and accompanying text for more analysis of New York’s particular
challenges.
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impact[s] the market’s ability to retain and justly compensate needed existing
resources and to attract new, competitively-compensated resources.”238 In
plainer speak, natural gas generators in particular are worried that the entry of
substantial renewable resources into the market might lower market prices
enough to drive fossil fuel companies out of business, or halt future construction
of fossil fuel-fired generation. Consequently, these RTOs have pushed for
reforms that limit the ability of “state-supported resources” to participate in their
markets.239 Curiously, though, these RTOs define “state support” only to include
certain state-driven policies that tend to promote clean energy, while leaving out
many long-standing federal and state subsidies to fossil fuel resources.240
FERC approved these changes to ISO New England’s capacity market in
2018 and finalized its approval of PJM’s capacity market redesign in 2020.241 In
fact, FERC went further than PJM had even requested, extending exclusions on
full market participation to a host of additional resources receiving state
support.242 In dissent, FERC Commissioner Richard Glick asserted that the
majority’s logic now “permits the Commission to zero out any state effort to
address the externalities associated with sales of electricity.”243 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the breadth of this order, states and other parties swiftly
filed challenges to it in a set of cases that has been consolidated in the Seventh
238. Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 5 (Mar. 9, 2018);
Macey & Salovaara, supra note 141, at 4 (explaining this phenomenon in more detail).
239. More specifically, these regions will now subject state-supported resources to a “minimum
offer price rule” that requires them to bid into capacity markets at levels less likely to clear and receive
payment. See Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 2–3 (Mar. 9,
2018); Order Establishing Just and Reasonable Rate, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169
FERC ¶ 61,239, at P 2 (Dec. 19, 2019) (directing “PJM to submit a replacement rate that . . . extends the
MOPR to include both new and existing resources, internal and external, that receive, or are entitled to
receive, certain out-of-market payments . . .”). Because, however, state law requires these resources to
be constructed to meet renewable procurement mandates, states will build them anyway—but they will
not count toward the regions’ installed capacity (unless, in ISO-NE, they then clear a “substitution
auction” and buy the capacity obligation of a resource that wants to retire, as explained in Order on
Tariff Filing, supra, at P 7). For more detailed accounts of these reforms, see Danny Cullenward &
Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean
Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. REGUL. BULL. 106 (2018); Macey & Salovaara, supra note 141, at 47–51.
240. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, 62,998 (Comm’r
Glick, dissenting) (accusing these reforms of specifically and arbitrarily targeting “state resource
decisionmaking, and particularly state efforts to address the externalities of electricity generation”);
Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, order on reh’g and clarification, 171 FERC ¶ 61,034, 61,235–
36 (Apr. 16, 2020) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting) (cataloguing the “federal subsidies [that] have pervaded
the energy sector for more than a century . . . ” in support of fossil fuels, and which “remain pervasive
in PJM”).
241. See Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205; Calpine Corp. v.
PJM Interconnection, LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019), order on reh’g and clarification, 171 FERC ¶
61,034 (Apr. 16, 2020).
242. See 171 FERC ¶ 61,034 at 61,226 (Apr. 16, 2020) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting) (describing
FERC’s order as creating “a sweeping definition of state subsidy that will subject much, if not most, of
the resources in PJM’s capacity market to a minimum offer price rule (MOPR)”).
243. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, 62,999 (2019), order
on reh’g and clarification, 171 FERC ¶ 61,034 (Apr. 16, 2020) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting).
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Circuit.244 If upheld, this order—like its counterpart in New England—will make
it difficult for renewable energy to participate in the regional capacity market—
which in turn will make it considerably more expensive for states to meet their
clean energy objectives.245 Many worry that the orders will have a particularly
pernicious effect on the development of promising but still-nascent technologies
like offshore wind, which several East Coast states are actively promoting
through state laws and policies.246
These reforms represent the antithesis of RTOs acting in their asserted role
of policy-taker. Numerous states have decided—under their well-established
Federal Power Act authority to control their own generation—that they prefer a
generation mix that emits less carbon dioxide, and they have used lawful state
policies to promote these ends.247 RTOs’ market reforms are protectionist
maneuvers by incumbents—in particular, fossil-fuel generation owners—to prop
up the fossil fuel industry against encroachment by these resources. RTOs have
identified no legitimate threat that renewables pose to their capacity markets,
beyond vague worries about the “integrity of competition” or “investor
confidence.”248
244. See Petition for Review of the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and Public Service
Commission of Maryland, N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/Merged-MOPR-Petition-for-Review-4.27.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GAP-K7JM]; Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Case No. 20-1645 (7th Cir.,
consolidated May 8, 2020).
245. See MICHAEL GOGGIN & ROB GRAMLICH, GRID STRATEGIES LLC, A MOVING TARGET:
AN UPDATE ON THE CONSUMER IMPACTS OF FERC INTERFERENCE WITH STATE POLICIES IN THE PJM
REGION 3–4 (2020) (observing that although “the cost [of the PJM order] depends on what price floors
FERC applies to various state-supported resources,” the reforms are likely to “result in billions or tens
of billions of dollars in excess costs to electricity consumers across PJM”); Catherine Morehouse,
Exelon, PSEG Urge New Jersey to Adopt FRR Alternative to PJM, as Competitive Providers Push for
CASPR, UTIL. DIVE (May 21, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-pseg-urge-new-jerseyto-adopt-frr-alternative-to-pjm-as-retail-pro/578380 [https://perma.cc/QAJ4-HXKT] (describing New
England’s capacity market reforms as forcing “clean generators to essentially buy their way in[to the
market] by paying an old resource to retire,” thus raising the costs of renewables) (quoting Rob
Gramlich) (alteration in original).
246. See Catherine Morehouse, State-Federal Tension ‘at an All Time High’ Between MOPR,
Net Metering Attack, Says Head Maryland Regulator, UTIL. DIVE (May 22, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/state-federal-tension-at-an-all-time-high-between-mopr-netmetering-atta/578471 [https://perma.cc/9DJL-JY28] (“The biggest immediate concern for states like
New Jersey and Maryland is the [PJM] order’s impact on offshore wind development—New Jersey is
aiming to add 7,500 MW by 2035 and Maryland’s renewable portfolio standard has a 1,200 MW
offshore wind carveout.”).
247. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (holding that states
act within their traditional domain by “encouraging production of new or clean generation” so long as
they do not condition programs on federal wholesale market participation); Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861
F.3d 82, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2017); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (explaining states’ rights to “limit new construction to more expensive, environmentallyfriendly units, or to take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities without direct
interference from the Commission”).
248. Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 21 (Mar. 9, 2018)
(describing capacity markets as designed “to produce a level of investor confidence that is sufficient to
ensure resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates”); Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions,
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But these market operators should not want fossil fuel generators to be
confident in building new, polluting generation for states that do not want it or
need it.249 There is no evidence that either New England or the mid-Atlantic faces
anything approaching a capacity deficit. Quite the opposite: during a ten-year
period of essentially flat demand growth between 2008 and 2017, PJM added
fifteen thousand megawatts of largely unnecessary new generation—almost all
of it natural gas.250 These additions have caused the region to substantially
exceed expert recommendations of needed capacity additions. The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a standard-setting
organization charged with determining the target reserve margin for each region
of the United States—that is, the percentage of supply that each region should
maintain above peak demand to ensure reliability.251 In summer 2018, NERC set
PJM’s target reserve margin at 16.1%.252 PJM’s actual margin that summer was
32.8%, and the region’s anticipated reserve margin in 2021 is an astounding
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Complaint, and Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the
Federal Power Act, Calpine Corp.v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 150 (June 29,
2018) (finding that increasing state out-of-market support for certain resources causes PJM’s market
design to fail to “protect the integrity of competition in the wholesale capacity market . . .”).
249. FERC Commissioner Glick made this point eloquently in his separately authored opinions
on the PJM and ISO-NE capacity market redesigns. See Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions,
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Complaint, and Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the
Federal Power Act, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C (June 29, 2018)
(Comm’r Glick, dissenting); Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New Engl. Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Comm’r
Glick, dissenting in part and concurring in part). States themselves have voiced strong opposition to
these reforms. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Fiordaliso, President, N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., to Ake
Almgren, Chairman, PJM Bd. of Managers at 2 (July 5, 2019) (critiquing PJM for not prioritizing “the
public interests of its own constituent States”); Comments of the Organization of PJM States, Inc. at 2,
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., FERC Docket Nos. EL19-58-000, ER19-1486-000 (May 15, 2019); Reply
Comments of the Maryland Public Service Commission, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC,
FERC Docket Nos. EL16-49-000, et al. (Nov. 5, 2018) (urging PJM to adopt capacity market reforms
that respect state policy preferences); Comments of the New England States Committee on Electricity
at 3, ISO New England Inc., FERC Docket No. ER18-619-000 (Jan. 29, 2018) (insisting that ISO-NE
monitor its reforms to ensure that it accommodates state resource preferences in practice); Protest by the
Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, the Connecticut Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection, and the Connecticut Office of Consumer Council, ISO New England Inc.,
FERC Docket No. ER18-619-000 (Jan. 29, 2018) (objecting to New England’s capacity market
reforms). See also PAUL HIBBARD, SUSAN TIERNEY & KATHERINE FRANKLIN, ELECTRICITY
MARKETS, RELIABILITY AND THE EVOLVING U.S. POWER SYSTEM 41 (2017) (arguing that retirements
of conventional resources present no reliability threat); Macey & Salovaara, supra note 141, at 42, 50;
Robbie Orvis, The State of U.S. Wholesale Power Markets: Is Reliability at Risk from Low Prices?,
UTIL. DIVE (May 22, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-state-of-us-wholesale-powermarkets-is-reliability-at-risk-from-low-pr/443273 [https://perma.cc/HJ34-Z236] (“[A] closer look at
data from several of the nation’s wholesale power markets indicates a ‘problem’ does not actually exist
at all; wholesale markets are operating as intended.”).
250. Stephanie Tsao & Richard Martin, Overpowered: PJM Market Rules Drive an Era of
Oversupply, S&P GLOBAL (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/latest-news-headlines/54111666 [https://perma.cc/7DJW-PAZU].
251. NERC Report Highlights Potential Summer Electricity Issues for Texas and California, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 18, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39892
[https://perma.cc/B7DF-4LDJ].
252. Tsao & Martin, supra note 250.
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45%.253 Across regions with capacity markets, similar results predominate—
with the consequence that consumers are paying over $1 billion each year for
unnecessary fossil fuel investments.254
All that said, I do not mean to suggest that grid operators face no challenges
in integrating renewables. But the legitimate concerns raised about renewables,
including fast ramps and resource seasonality, cannot be appropriately addressed
through the crude mechanism of capacity market payments.255 What is needed
to address these challenges is a focus on enhancing the grid’s flexibility—a
feature that many fossil fuel plants receiving capacity payments do not support,
and which most RTOs have consequently failed to adopt as a key system
criterion.256
One final and growing set of RTO actions that discriminates against
renewables bears highlighting: the recent obsession with “fuel security.” The
plans hatched by President Donald Trump and the Department of Energy to
subsidize coal and nuclear power as “fuel-secure” resources have received
significant attention the last couple of years.257 None of these plans has come to
fruition, largely because FERC in 2018 did not accept that these resources—
whose distinguishing characteristic is that they can store large quantities of fuel
on-site—especially contribute to the resiliency of the grid.258 Yet these same
253. Id.
254. See ROB GRAMLICH & MICHAEL GOGGIN, GRID STRATEGIES LLC, TOO MUCH OF THE
WRONG THING: THE NEED FOR CAPACITY MARKET REPLACEMENT OR REFORM 7, 16 (2019) (finding
that capacity markets attract predominantly natural gas across markets and estimating $1.4 billion in
excess costs across PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO). In RTOs without mandatory capacity markets,
environmentalists have raised concerns that a different method of propping up uneconomic fossil fuel
resources has emerged in the form of self-scheduling. Self-scheduling occurs when a generator indicates
to its RTO that it plans to run during a certain period of time irrespective of market price—and many
coal resources in these regions have done precisely this. See JEREMY FISHER, AL ARMENDARIZ,
MATTHEW MILLER, BRENDAN PIERPONT, CASEY ROBERTS, JOSH SMITH & GREG WANNIER, SIERRA
CLUB, PLAYING WITH OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: HOW NON-ECONOMIC COAL OPERATIONS DISTORT
ENERGY MARKETS 4, 8 (2019) (finding costs of $3.5 billion to the region from self-scheduling, resulting
in 10% more coal being utilized). However, self-scheduling presents less concern for purposes of my
analysis, because states in these regions retain control over self-scheduling behaviors and have tools to
reform the practice. See Tom Kleckner, Enviros, States Question Coal Self-Commitments, RTO INSIDER
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://rtoinsider.com/enviros-states-question-coal-self-commitments-149256
[https://perma.cc/YP62-F6CV] (describing how Minnesota and Missouri have launched investigations
into self-scheduling).
255. See Cullenward & Welton, supra note 239, at 117–18. See also Macey & Salovaara, supra
note 141, at 45 (critiquing FERC for “treat[ing] capacity markets as a stand-in for reliability”).
256. See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 254, at 11–12 (“What the grid increasingly needs is
flexibility . . . and many fossil and nuclear resources that receive large capacity payments provide little
to no flexibility.”).
257. See JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 138, at 16–27 (documenting this saga); Emily Holden,
Pruitt Says Coal Losses Make Grid Vulnerable. Not Really, E&E NEWS (June 7, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060055661 [https://perma.cc/Y3Y9-GA49].
258. Memorandum from Rick Perry, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy, to Chief of Staff, Dep’t of Energy
(Apr. 14, 2017); Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and
Establishing Additional Procedures, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, at P
25(d) (Jan. 8, 2018) (terminating the Department of Energy’s proposed rulemaking); see also Trevor
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concepts have motivated changes in RTO rules that privilege traditional
resources over renewables, on scant evidence to justify such differential
treatment.259 Most glaringly, ISO-NE has had an ongoing controversy about how
best to ensure adequate electricity supplies during the winter, when the region
often risks a shortage of natural gas.260 ISO-NE recently proposed a short-term
solution under which ratepayers would subsidize uneconomic fossil fuel plants
by about $150 million per year to provide “winter energy security.”261 After the
Commission initially expressed skepticism about ISO-NE’s proposal,262 FERC’s
procedural rules allowed the proposal to go into effect in August 2019 due to
lack of a quorum to vote the proposal up or down.263 Many worry that this
incident is a harbinger of more actions to come from RTO incumbents using the
amorphous concept of “fuel security” to prop up increasingly uneconomic fossil
fuel resources.264
The key takeaway of this analysis is that the policy priorities required to
address climate change place particular strain on RTO governance. That said,
readers may have noticed that the discussion above focused on certain RTOs
more than others. Not all RTOs are equally resistant to renewables or demandside resources. MISO, for example, has been a leader in integrating wind into its
system, along with the Southwestern Power Pool.265 Similarly, California has led
the way on promoting more fulsome integration of DER and storage.266 It is
Houser, John Larsen & Peter Marsters, The Real Electricity Reliability Crisis, RHODIUM GRP. (Oct. 3,
2017), https://rhg.com/research/the-real-electricity-reliability-crisis-doe-nopr [https://perma.cc/E8NKHJFM] (finding that between 2012 and 2016, 0.00007% of electricity disruptions were “due to fuel
supply problems,” mostly caused by one event in Northern Minnesota that “involved a coal-fired power
plant”).
259. See JACOBS AND PESKOE, supra note 138, at 9 (“Fuel availability is not causing
blackouts.”).
260. See Order Accepting Agreement, Subject to Condition, and Directing Briefs, Constellation
Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267 (Dec. 20, 2018).
261. Inventoried Energy Program at 1, ISO New England, FERC Docket No. ER19-1428-000
(Mar. 25, 2019).
262. See Letter from FERC Office of Energy Market Regulation to NYISO, Re: Compliance
Filing to Order No. 841, Docket No. ER19-467-000 (Apr. 1, 2019).
263. See Notice of Filing Taking Effect by Operation of Law, ISO New England Inc., FERC
Docket No. ER19-1428-001 (Aug. 6, 2019); Statement of Commissioner Glick at 1, ISO New England
Inc., FERC Docket No. ER19-1428-001 (Aug. 8, 2019).
264. See, e.g., Constellation Mystic Power, LLC at 5, FERC Docket No. ER18-1639-000 (Dec.
20, 2018) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting) (accusing the Commission of jurisdictional overreach to bail out
a natural gas import facility); Bruce Ho, New England Grid Operator Ignores Value of Offshore Wind,
NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/new-england-gridoperator-ignores-value-offshore-wind [https://perma.cc/2GNL-6K9F] (describing how ISO-NE has
discriminated against offshore wind).
265. See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, Kleckner, Another Wind Penetration Record for SPP,
supra note 18; Kleckner, Overheard at the Great Plains Institute SPP Workshop, supra note 18.
266. Comments of Advanced Energy Economy at 1, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., FERC
Docket
No.
ER19-468-000
(Feb.
7,
2019)
(commending
“CAISO for its leadership in integrating advanced energy technologies . . . into its markets”); Jason
Fordney, CAISO Moves Ahead with Load-Shifting, DR Products, RTO INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://rtoinsider.com/caiso-demand-response-energy-storage-84916 [https://perma.cc/H335-SDSC]
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important to emphasize these regional differences when diagnosing what
precisely has gone wrong in RTO governance, and what continues to go right. I
consider what can be learned from divergent RTO practices in Part V. First,
though, I return to governance theory to illuminate the institutional forces behind
the troubling RTO behaviors described in this Section.
IV.
PRIVATIZATION AS THE PROBLEM: DIAGNOSING RTOS’ FLAWS
It is time to connect the dots. Parts I and II introduced RTOs,
contextualizing them as variations on the theme of privatization that has swept
through U.S. governance. Part III illustrated why RTOs are problematic in
practice, showing how they have resisted the policy priorities of state and federal
regulators. This Section links RTOs’ origin story and their performance to
diagnose what has gone wrong in RTO governance, highlighting how the failures
detailed in Part III are the result of flawed institutional design. In brief, I contend
that FERC was shortsighted in structuring regional grid governors as private
membership entities answerable to regulators only under the traditional legal
levers of utility rate regulation.
Many scholars writing during the boom days of privatization approached
the movement equivocally. To evaluate its wisdom in any given context, they
suggested, required weighing the efficiency and effectiveness gains that more
entrepreneurial governance might provide against the likely losses in direct
governmental or political accountability.267 Two decades in, the experience of
RTOs eludes even this generous framing.268 RTOs’ membership-club format has
not led to entrepreneurial efficiency—to the contrary, incumbents use these
institutions to block cost-reducing reforms. At the same time, this governance
structure has created a growing rift between the objectives of market operators
and the democratically determined objectives of state and federal regulators—in
just the ways that many critics of outsourcing had predicted.269

(describing California’s “years-long effort to integrate more storage and demand response [DR] into its
markets”).
267. See KOSAR, supra note 54, at ii (describing the “controversial” pitting of supporters of quasigovernment, who want to maximize performance, against detractors, who worry about weakening the
capacity of government); Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES
115, 121–22, (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (contrasting political accountability with accountability
through market competition); Moe, supra note 74, at 290 (contrasting “entrepreneurial” and
“constitutionalist” viewpoints on hybrid organizations). Some even hoped that new governance could
simultaneously promote “economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy.” See Lobel, supra note 55, at
344.
268. Cf. O’Connell, supra note 58, at 852 (suggesting that “boundary entities, in some cases,
might sacrifice the goals of both efficiency and accountability that shape agency design”).
269. See Mashaw, supra note 267, at 135–36; see also Minow, note 71, at 1235 (describing the
challenges of private actors adjudicating access to services).
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This Section discusses why FERC should abandon hope in RTOs’
membership-club democracy as a sound method of grid management. After
building the case that a reform effort focused on RTOs’ internal governance
flaws is inadequate, the Section goes on to diagnose two larger accountability
gaps that, it argues, form the real core of RTO governance problems: an inversion
of the proper hierarchy between RTOs’ responsibilities and states’ legitimate
policy priorities, and an oversight deficit between RTOs and their primary
government regulator, FERC.
A. The Limits of Self-Regulation
Much of the recent research on RTOs has focused on their internal
governance processes. In aggregate, this research suggests that these processes
(outside California) excel at producing reforms that serve incumbents’ business
interests but struggle to effectuate reforms that enhance competition or shrink
the demand for electricity. This subpart summarizes this research, before arguing
that a holistic view of RTO governance flaws suggests the need for more robust
fixes than are typically suggested.
One clear pattern in RTO governance is a tendency to favor building
traditional infrastructure. Recall that most RTO governance processes utilize
weighted sectoral voting, with demand and supply sides of the market ostensibly
checking each other.270 However, this theory of self-checking has never really
had a grounding in reality. As FERC observed in 2002 with respect to PJM,
“[f]our of [the region’s five membership] classes represent interests that would
benefit from higher levels of demand.”271 That is to say, generation and
transmission-owning entities generally all want to build more infrastructure, and
those selling electricity generally prefer to sell more of it.272 Of the voting sectors
in PJM, only end-use customers have a strong incentive to favor demandreducing technologies.273 The other natural watchdog against overbuilding
tendencies is consumer advocates. However, in most regions, consumer
advocates have no voting power, and at most they hold 8 percent (in MISO).274
Accordingly, it proves relatively easy to muster supermajority support for
incumbent-supply-enhancing proposals within RTO governance processes.275

270. See supra Part II.B.1 and Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (summarizing voting sectors
in each RTO).
271. See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,521 (Aug. 29, 2002) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (2019)).
272. See Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 209, at 1531.
273. See supra Part II.B.1.
274. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (showing consumer advocate weighted votes by
region).
275. See supra notes 249–254 and accompanying text regarding oversupply in RTOs with
capacity markets.
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In contrast, when proposals are advanced to increase competition and
promote new technologies, it proves difficult to overcome supermajority voting
thresholds. For example, in their 2018 modeling of PJM voting patterns on
capacity market reforms, Kyungjin Yoo and Seth Blumsack found that of six
proposals advanced in PJM to reform the oversupplied capacity market, not one
could obtain the supermajority support necessary to advance out of the Members
Committee—despite the fact that the “status quo” option received the least
support of all.276 Other reforms beneficial to consumers often wither and die in
committee, as evidenced by RTOs’ patterned responses to demand-side
technologies and clean energy. 277
Independent RTO boards could provide a check on the incumbent bias of
stakeholder processes. Recall that RTO boards are generally not bound by the
outcome of stakeholder voting processes.278 However, RTO boards have been
critiqued as overly focused on two interests. The first is reliability, which these
boards prioritize in their “institutional self-interest,” given the extreme negative
reactions that transmission-scale blackouts provoke.279 The second is the
interests of transmission-holding companies, whose withdrawal would shrink the
geographical footprint of the RTO.280 In combination, these institutional interests
appear to prevent robust policing of incumbent favoritism and render these
boards imperfect stewards of the public interest.
As illustrative examples of opaque board interests, consider the processes
producing the anti-renewable capacity market reforms in PJM and ISO New
England. Each region failed to secure supermajority support for these reforms—

276.
277.

Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 30, at 139, 148.
See supra Part III; see also KYUNGJIN YOO, VOTING BEHAVIOR IN PJM REGIONAL
TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION 1 (2016) (finding that sectoral voting coalitions are frequently able to
block the passage of PJM market reforms); Cramton, supra note 208, at 4–5 (reporting “numerous
examples of basic market flaws . . . enduring for an extended period” of time because of “changes that
would adversely impact a large and organized group of participants, such as the suppliers”); E4THE
FUTURE, supra note 30, at 6; James et al., supra note 8, at 14 (“[S]takeholders who wish to maintain a
power imbalance may use their current power advantage to discourage periodic review and adjustments
that disadvantage them.”); Comments of Solar Energy Industries Association in Support of Opening
Competitive Market Participation for Electric Storage and Distributed Energy Resources, Electric
Storage Participation in Mkts Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Operators at 3,
FERC Docket Nos. RM16-23, AS16-20 (Feb. 23, 2017) (asserting that new entrants face “an inherent
disadvantage in a multi-region stakeholder process”); Elise Caplan & Patrick E. McCullar, Markets in
Name Only: Mandatory Capacity Markets and their Adverse Impact on Load-Serving Entities, 26 ELEC.
J. 52, 52–53 (2013) (arguing that in RTO capacity markets “complex rules have been rewritten to create
barriers to entry and anti-competitive conditions that provide an optimal earnings scenario for one group
of sellers (incumbent merchant generators) by restricting the entry of new supply”).
278. There are limited exceptions to this statement, including PJM’s split filing rights and a
special ISO-NE provision for “jump ball” filings. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14.
279. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 562.
280. See id. at 558; SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 24; Protest, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and
Request for Recusal of Commissioner McNamee of Public Citizen, Inc., PJM Interconnection, LLC,
FERC Docket Nos. EL19-58, 19-1468. at 3 (May 15, 2019) (noting that PJM’s rate proposal would
benefit only the narrow interests of its nuclear-, coal-, and natural gas-owning members).
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and each board proceeded nevertheless, in the face of state opposition.281 In fact,
PJM’s Board could not even come to an internal consensus. The region instead
offered “two alternate (mutually exclusive) proposals,” each of which failed the
stakeholder process, for the Commission to choose between.282 It is difficult to
know each board’s internal motivations for filing changes that did not pass
internal governance proceedings. But the pattern displayed—championing
reforms that benefit large incumbent interests, at the expense of clean energy
developers and over state protests—lends some force to worries that RTO boards
may prioritize capacity over-procurement and self-preservation.283
The most frequently proposed solution to these governance flaws is internal
governance reform.284 However, I believe the transformation demanded by
climate change cuts too deeply against theories of industry self-regulation to
make internal reforms an effective stand-alone solution. Industry self-regulation
works when the incumbent firms in an industry expect to be the firms of
tomorrow, and expect their long-lived infrastructure investments to pay
dividends.285 In that case, all firms have reciprocal incentives to engage in fair
dealing.286 But for climate change policies to succeed, certain companies—most
notably, those that have invested in coal and natural gas infrastructure—must
lose money and market share.287 To avoid this outcome, they will use their voting
power to bias market rules in favor of their assets.
Even if voting sectors within RTOs were weighted differently, such that
clean energy companies had more say in governance, the level of industry
consolidation that has followed in the wake of PUHCA’s repeal could still skew
voting patterns in favor of traditional generation sources. One component of
electricity sector deregulation—particularly in the eastern states—was the

281. See Letter from ISO New England, to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regul.
Comm’n, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to
Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources, Docket No. ER18-619-000, at 27 n.88–89
(Jan. 8, 2018); Transmittal Letter re: Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal: Tariff
Revisions to Address Impacts of State Public Policies on the PJM Capacity Market at 41, PJM
Interconnection, LLC, FERC Docket No. ER18-1314-000 (Apr. 9, 2018).
282. See PJM Transmittal Letter, supra note 281 at 6.
283. See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 254, at 18.
284. See Brooks, supra note 21 (summarizing calls from senators and commissioners to review
RTO governance processes for compliance with the principles of Order 719 and to ensure greater
transparency and stakeholder access); E4THEFUTURE, supra note 30, at 14 (considering whether RTOs
should create a new voting sector for clean energy resources); SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 2 (arguing
that “FERC should consider requiring . . . RTO/ISO’s to periodically evaluate their stakeholder
governance systems . . . ”); James et al., supra note 8, at 19 (recommending a reexamination of RTOs’
internal governance); Amanda Durish Cook, Task Team Zeroes in on MISO Board Recommendations,
RTO INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2019) https://rtoinsider.com/miso-board-qualification-task-team-141978
[https://perma.cc/Z2YH-PLQM] (describing how MISO is considering reserving a board seat for
“candidates who have experience representing utility customers”).
285. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
286. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 82, at 8; Park, supra note 82, at 144; Omarova,
supra note 82, at 416.
287. See supra Part III.A.
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splitting apart of previously vertically integrated utilities into oppositional
entities: supply on the one hand, and demand on the other.288 But the incomplete
restructuring of the industry, combined with the return of mega-holding
companies, erodes these gains: now large holding companies have numerous
assets on both the supply and demand side of the ledger, creating large combined
voting sway in RTO governance.289 For RTO governance to prove effective
under these conditions, demand-serving affiliates within a holding company
would have to check their supply-side sister companies. Technically, affiliates
are supposed to be walled off from one another in stakeholder processes, so that
such opposition can occur.290 But in practice, it is nearly impossible to know how
often affiliates align their votes with holding company priorities, because only
vote totals—not who voted for what—are recorded in lower-level committee
meetings, where affiliate abuse might happen.291 Moreover, there has also been
substantial consolidation in the ownership of merchant (i.e., competitive, nonutility) gas-fired plants in recent years: private equity firms have purchased a
large number of such plants in the United States, along with making significant
investments in shale oil plays.292 This consolidation, too, creates obvious
incentives for these entities to ensure that market rules perpetuate these fossil
resources.
All to say, it is difficult to continue to trust in the RTO construct when
legislators and regulators have abnegated what used to be a core element of
public utility doctrine: ensuring that dominant corporations do not, through a
combination of concentrated vertical and horizontal power, run their sector for
their own gain at the expense of people and the planet. On this topic, one final
288. See Spence, supra note 9, at 772–75.
289. For example, Simeone found that “in 2015, over 77 percent of the generation resources
needed to meet PJM’s peak were controlled, in full or in part, by only 10 companies.” SIMEONE, supra
note 30, at 38. Her research further indicates that six major holding companies controlled the majority
of this generation. See id. (breaking down megawatts of generation owned by parent company). Note
that this figure explicitly excludes renewable energy resources. Id.
290. See SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 36 (“Restructured energy companies are legally supposed
to have functional firewalls between business segments (e.g., generation, transmission, and distribution)
that prevent collusion among these Affiliates, in order to promote competition and reduce monopoly
power.”).
291. See JONATHAN RAAB & PATRICK FIELD, RAAB ASSOCS., LTD., AN ASSESSMENT OF PJM’S
GOVERNANCE AND STAKEHOLDER PROCESS 12–16 (2009); SIMEONE, supra note 30, at 32 (observing
that a transmission company “that has significant generation assets and electric distribution companies
is likely to vote on proposals that benefit the generation asset (e.g. increase capacity prices)”).
292. See, e.g., Lawrence Delevingne, Private Equity Bets on Energy ‘Revolution’—in Oil and
Gas, CNBC (Nov. 17, 2014, 2:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/17/energy-in-25-years-privateequity-bets-on-energy-revolutionin-oil-and-gas.html [https://perma.cc/6LZD-K69F]; Naureen S. Malik
& Brian Eckhouse, Private Equity’s Big Bet on Cheap Gas-Fired Plants Has Gone Awry, BLOOMBERG
(May 23, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/private-equity-sbig-bet-on-cheap-gas-fired-plants-has-gone-awry [https://perma.cc/WK2P-E4GD]; Elena Millerman,
Christopher Richardson & Ariel Oseasohn, Developments in Midstream Oil and Gas Finance in the
United
States,
WHITE
&
CASE
(Apr.
10,
2020),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/developments-midstream-oil-and-gas-finance-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/2PF7-J8GN].
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point about skewed RTO incentives bears mention: even if the effects of industry
consolidation were not a concern, a well-structured private RTO would still
likely have interests out of step with the pressing and growing public interest in
addressing climate change. An industry organization fundamentally devoted to
keeping the lights on at reasonable prices cannot be expected to magically
prioritize solving a problem that throws its basic operations out of whack. That
is—or should be—the job of external regulators. Remember, RTOs are not
operating in a legal vacuum. The courts have made clear that these entities are
subject to public utility regulation, the same as any investor-owned utility.293
Thus, in my estimation, the bigger question that research into RTO governance
leaves unanswered is this: what has gone wrong in these external oversight
processes? Why aren’t states and FERC able to channel RTO decision-making
in the ways that federal statutory law contemplates? The remainder of this
Section constructs that analysis, considering why the mechanisms built to
superimpose democratically determined prerogatives on the electricity industry
are failing.
B. RTOs Trample States’ Legitimate Priorities
Recall that the Federal Power Act gives states control over electricity
generation and retail sales.294 This jurisdictional split has been critical in
upholding a range of state laws aimed at promoting renewable energy and, most
recently, nuclear energy.295 Even as courts have moved toward recognizing the
electricity space as one of “collaborative federalism,” rather than a bright-line
split in jurisdiction,296 they have remained clear that states retain their
prerogative to determine the energy mix within their borders—so long as they
do not explicitly regulate FERC’s wholesale markets.297
As RTOs have established rules regarding transmission planning and
energy and capacity market participation, they have increasingly touched upon

293. See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
294. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018).
295. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding Illinois
legislation supporting nuclear power); Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynergy Inc. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d
41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Rhodes, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019)
(upholding New York legislation supporting nuclear power); Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 99
(2d Cir. 2017) (upholding Connecticut’s state contracting program for renewable energy).
296. Compare Coal. for Competitive Elec., 906 F.3d at 46 (describing the FPA as a “collaborative
scheme”), FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016) (describing FERC’s rule as
creating a “program of cooperative federalism”), and Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct.
1288, 1300 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the FPA as a “collaborative federalism”
statute) with Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (“Congress meant to
draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction . . . .”). Several scholars have
written in detail about this shift. See sources cited supra note 27.
297. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; Allco Fin. Ltd., 861 F.3d at 87; Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util.
Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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matters of state concern.298 In theory, that should not be a problem: RTOs’
persistent claims that they are neutral policy-takers means they should take state
policy priorities as market constraints.299 But as described in Part III, that’s not
what these organizations are doing. Certain RTOs’ aggressive use of market
rules to wall state-supported renewable energy out of markets, and to resist the
incorporation of other new technologies, puts the lie to arguments that RTOs
passively accept state clean energy policies. To the contrary, RTOs have
established market rules that undermine states’ goals in favor of increasing the
profits of incumbent member utilities.300
States are largely powerless within RTO governance processes to do
anything about the fact that RTOs are undermining their lawful state policies (at
least outside California). Even though FERC realized at the inception of RTOs
that their governance would directly impact state policies, it hesitated to give
states any formalized role in RTO governance.301 Consequently, states have been
left with merely an advisory role in RTO policy-making in most regions—and
this role does not carry nearly enough weight when it gets in the way of memberutilities’ profits. To take one example, PJM acknowledged that proponents of
anti-renewable reforms in its markets intended to “[disincentivize] states from
providing subsidies in the first instance.”302 Such initiatives amount to a brazen
usurpation of lawful state prerogatives for the gain of private fossil fuel interests.
States that object to the policy impacts (and hefty price tags) of RTO market
rules do have a “nuclear option”: they can require their jurisdictional utilities to
withdraw from the RTO. Indeed, several states have initiated efforts along these
lines. New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities has begun a proceeding to consider
whether to withdraw its utilities from the PJM capacity market and have the state
guarantee resource adequacy instead,303 and Maryland has indicated its interest
298. See supra Part II.B. See also Boyd, supra note 13, at 1669–70 (“[M]arket design matters a
great deal.”); Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and Environmental Law, 41
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 339, 359 (2017) (describing how these market rules “determine the order in which
different types of energy, such as coal, natural gas, and wind power, will be dispatched to satisfy
demand . . .”).
299. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part III; see also Dissent in Part of Commissioner Richard Glick on ISO New
England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee at 2, FERC Docket No. ER19-444000 (Jan. 29, 2019) (accusing ISO-NE of exhibiting a preference for fossil fuels).
301. Several commenters on Order 2000 (including some states) suggested that state voting rights
within RTOs would be “inappropriate” or “awkward,” given potentially related federal and state
proceedings and possible parochial tendencies of state officials. See Order 2000, supra note 11, at 849.
302. See Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal: Tariff Revisions to
Address Impacts of State Public Policies on the PJM Capacity Market at 56 n.138, PJM Interconnection,
LLC, FERC Docket No. ER18-1314 (Apr. 9, 2018).
303. See Order Initiating Proceeding at 1, In the Matter of BPU Investigation of Res. Adequacy
Alternatives,
N.J.
Bd.
Pub.
Utils.,
No.
EO20030203
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.nj.gov/bpu/pdf/boardorders/2020/20200325/3-27-20-2H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YR74QQCK]. Note that PJM has a unique mechanism allowing for a utility to remain in the RTO while
exiting the capacity market, through opting to use a “Fixed Resource Requirement” plan in lieu of
capacity market participation. See PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 808 (D. Md.
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in a similar move.304 Connecticut has threatened to go further by withdrawing
from ISO-NE altogether.305
However, although legally permissible, pulling utilities out of an RTO is a
fraught and time-consuming process. FERC approval must be secured, and a
withdrawing state or utility would have to figure out how to replace a host of
complex technical and engineering oversight functions previously performed by
the RTO.306 Whether the eastern RTOs’ aggressive recent actions finally prompt
any states to follow through on withdrawal remains to be seen.307 Even so, these
withdrawals would scarcely be a clean energy victory, given the benefits that
broad regionalization offers clean energy.308 Thus the ability to exit gives states
devoted to a clean energy transition at best incomplete leverage within their
RTOs.
It is worth acknowledging that not every state objects to RTOs’ frequent
incumbency biases. Indeed, some states themselves continue to adopt special
supports for fossil fuels,309 which is their lawful prerogative under the Federal
Power Act. More generally, states have frequently voiced concerns that RTO
rule changes to incorporate demand-side technologies may usurp state
jurisdiction.310 But jurisdictional concerns aside, states have largely supported

2013), aff’d 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S.
Ct. 1288 (2016) (explaining this option).
304. See Morehouse, supra note 245.
305. See ARI PESKOE, HARV. ELEC. L. INITIATIVE, ISO-NEXIT: EXPLORING PATHWAYS FOR A
UTILITY’S WITHDRAWAL FROM NEW ENGLAND’S REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION 1
(2020) (citing remarks from Connecticut’s head of Department of Energy and Environment to this
effect).
306. See id. at 7 (observing that presently, “[i]n addition to administering FERC-regulated
energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets, ISO-NE serves as the NERC-approved Reliability
Coordinator, Balancing Authority, Transmission Operator, Transmission Service Provider, Planning
Coordinator, Resource Planner, Reserve Sharing Group, and Transmission Planner”).
307. See Order Establishing Just and Reasonable Rate, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, 62,995 P 2 (Dec. 19, 2019) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting) (predicting that
states might finally abandon PJM due to their overly restrictive rules regarding participation of statesupported resources).
308. See infra Part V.
309. See, e.g., Leah C. Stokes, While the Planet Overheats, Ohio’s Coal Industry Gets a Bailout,
GUARDIAN
(July
28,
2019,
10:39
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/28/planet-overheats-ohios-coal-industry-gets-abailout [https://perma.cc/VT9U-JS9N] (describing an Ohio law that subsidizes coal and rolls back clean
energy programs); see also FISHER, ARMENDARIZ, MILLER, PIERPONT, ROBERTS, SMITH & WANNIER,
supra note 254, regarding self-scheduling.
310. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Petitioners at 15, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC,
964 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (arguing on behalf of the trade group for state public utility regulators
that FERC regulation of “local storage resources located on the local distribution system” usurps state
jurisdiction); Request for Rehearing of the Organization of MISO States, Demand Response Comp. in
Organized Wholesale Mkts., FERC Docket No. RM10-17-000 (Apr. 14, 2011) (opposing FERC’s
proposed payment levels for demand response); Request for Rehearing on Behalf of the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio at 3, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Elec. Mkts., FERC
Docket Nos. RM07-19-000 & AD07-7-000 (Nov. 14, 2008); Emily Holden, States Unhappy with Order
1000 Implementation, CQ ROLL CALL (July 25, 2013).
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FERC-led efforts to reduce costs in RTOs by including more resources.311 And
many of those states most active on climate have pleaded for more support from
their RTO—or at least not active hostility—to help accomplish their clean energy
goals.312 Similarly, several regional state organizations have written letters to
their RTOs asking for rule revisions to better respect state clean energy goals and
help incorporate cost-saving, climate-friendly technologies.313
That RTOs have acted so slowly—and sometimes intransigently—in the
face of these state pleas suggests a mismatch in the current duties of RTOs and
the role of state regulators in these organizations.314 Several scholars have
commended RTOs as regional-level institutions in which states can play an
important role—and I agree, as a matter of theory.315 But in practice, the current
relative powerlessness of states within RTOs inverts the hierarchy that the
Federal Power Act creates between policy-makers and market operators. Part V
considers how a reexamination of the state role in RTOs might be one way of
improving their functionality.

311. Most recently, states proved supportive of Order 841’s broad goal of removing barriers to
participation by electric storage resources in wholesale markets: California, the New England States
Committee on Electricity, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, the Organization of Midcontinent
System Operator States, and Ohio all issued statements of support for the order’s goals in their filings.
See Notice of Intervention and Comments of the California Public Utilities Commission at 3, Elec.
Storage Participation in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC
Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (Feb. 13, 2017); Comments of the New England States Committee on
Electricity at 3, 13, Elec. Storage Participation in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and
Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (Feb. 13, 2017); Comments of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities at 8–9, FERC Docket No. 16-23-000 (Feb. 13, 2017);
Connecticut’s Comments Regarding NOPR on Energy Storage at 1, Elec. Storage Participation in Mkts.
Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et
al. (Feb. 10, 2017); Comments of the Delaware Public Service Commission at 2, Elec. Storage
Participation in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC Docket
Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (Feb. 13, 2017); Comments of the Organization of MISO States at 1–2, Elec.
Storage Participation in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC
Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (Feb. 13, 2017); Comments Submitted on Behalf of the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio at 2–3, Elec. Storage Participation in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs.
and Indep. Sys. Operators, FERC Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (Feb. 13, 2017).
312. See sources cited supra note 249.
313. See, e.g., Letter from New England States Comm. on Elec. to ISO New England at 1 (July
16, 2019) (requesting ISO-NE dedicate resources to “support states and stakeholders in analyzing and
discussing potential future market frameworks that contemplate and are compatible with the
implementation of state energy and environmental laws”); Letter from John R. Rosales, President, Org.
of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI), to Howard Schneider, Chairman, PJM Bd. of Managers (Feb. 7, 2018)
(opposing capacity market reforms); Letter from New England States Comm. on Elec. to ISO New
England (Feb. 15, 2018) (questioning the weak assumptions made about state renewable energy
development and suggesting that fuel security risks are consequently overblown); Org. of PJM States,
Inc., OPSI Resolution 2017-01: Demand Side Resource Participation in PJM Markets (Oct. 5, 2017)
(asking for more steps to be taken on demand response); Org. of PJM States, Inc., OPSI Resolution
2016-3: Demand Response and Capacity Markets (July 25, 2016) (similar).
314. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 1 (“How decision-making power is balanced between
state and federal regulators determines whose goals are prioritized—state environmental and economic
development policies, or generator revenue sufficiency and investor confidence.”).
315. See Lyons, supra note 27, at 972; Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 28, at 53.
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C. RTOs and FERC: Diminishment and Aggrandizement
One retort to my critiques of the weak role of state regulators in RTOs is
that FERC is there to mind the store—and to act as an adjudicator of federalist
tensions within energy policy.316 Perhaps the problem, then, is with the agency.
Certainly this is true in part. But as I explain below, the privatized RTO structure
both diminishes and aggrandizes the role of FERC in problematic ways, with
respect to different policy priorities. In short, the structure of FERC’s legal
oversight of RTOs makes it easy for FERC to justify approving reforms favored
by incumbents, but difficult for the agency to force the industry to innovate.
1. Diminished FERC Authority in the Face of Competing Priorities
Take the first category of RTO challenges catalogued above: resistance to
FERC’s efforts to incorporate demand response, storage, and DER into their
markets.317 Here, FERC’s priorities—ensuring lower-cost electricity by
including more demand-side resources—have been at odds with those of
incumbent generation and transmission owners.318 Moreover, RTOs’ focus on
reliability above other priorities gives these organizations limited incentives to
take risks on new resources. It has thus taken numerous orders and much cajoling
for FERC to get RTOs to adopt necessary reforms—with many changes still
needed.319
One might view this situation as tolerable—after all, FERC has ordered
RTOs into action on these resources. But scholars and students of administrative
law should quickly see that this is an odd way for agency policy-making to
proceed.320 To force RTOs to address FERC’s priorities, the agency must first
issue a finding under Federal Power Act section 206 that current RTO tariffs are
“unjust and unreasonable.”321 Then, RTOs work through their internal
governance processes to propose solutions. If FERC rejects a proposal, the whole
process starts over—often, over the course of more than a year, while the
problem that provoked FERC’s section 206 finding festers on. FERC has thus
created a regulatory structure that is a far cry from the typical Chevron deference
to agency action, in which the agency selects the best path forward under flexible

316. There is an ongoing scholarly conversation on the broader propriety of federal agencies
mediating federalism disputes. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933
(2008); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695
(2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
317. See supra Part III.B.
318. See Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 271, at 1531 (“[T]he rate structure in most
jurisdictions creates incentives for utilities to promote demand growth.”).
319. See supra Part II.A.
320. Cf. Moe, supra note 74, at 290 (noting that hybrid entities are better able than agencies to
“pursue their own institutional interests, which may or may not conform to the public interest as defined
by the nation’s elected leadership”).
321. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(e)(4)(a) (2018).
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statutory authority.322 The statutory requirement that FERC accept any RTO
practice that it cannot prove patently unreasonable—coupled with FERC’s
tendency to solve problems through regional compliance filings—diminishes the
agency’s ability to accomplish desirable reforms on any reasonable timeline. To
make RTOs better servants of the public interest, a new model of agency
oversight is necessary.
2. Aggrandized FERC Authority When Interests Align
Better oversight would not, however, have stopped RTOs’ recent efforts to
block renewables’ participation or to prioritize fuel security as a marker of grid
resiliency.323 Here, FERC has been firmly on board. Indeed, in the case of PJM,
the Commission ordered the RTO to be even more punitive with respect to “statesupported resource[s]” than the region had proposed.324 A similar dynamic
adhered in the recent case of New York ISO’s (NYISO’s) proposed revisions to
its capacity market. After reaching agreement among its stakeholders and market
monitor, NYISO filed a request to amend its tariff to better align capacity market
rules with state public policy preferences for renewable energy.325 In September
2020, the Commission denied this request on the grounds that NYISO did not
“provide sufficient justification” for prioritizing resources favored by state
policy.326 This decision again provoked a strong dissent from Commissioner
Glick, who accused the Commission of erecting “a mind-boggling series of
unnecessary and unreasoned obstacles aimed at stalling New York’s efforts to
transition the state toward its clean energy future.”327
As these developments illustrate, the Trump Administration has staffed a
Commission that has frequently favored coal and natural gas over renewable
resources—causing many to worry that FERC, once a bulwark independent
commission, may be dominated by administration loyalists in ways that undercut
its mission to ensure just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates.328 So what
does private governance have to do with this challenge?
322. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See
also Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1462 (2018) (finding agency win rates under Chevron steps one and two of 77.4% and 93.8%,
respectively).
323. See supra Part III.C.
324. See Order Establishing a Just and Reasonable Rate, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection,
LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, 62,993 (Dec. 19, 2019) (expanding the minimum offer price rule to include
new self-supplying resources and public power as well as clean energy resources that receive state
subsidies).
325. See N.Y. System Op., Inc., supra note 237, at P 3 (describing agreement), P 8, 18 (describing
NYISO’s rationale for the proposal).
326. Id. at P 29.
327. Id. (Comm’r Glick, dissenting, at P 1).
328. Gavin Bade, How McConnell’s Coal Guy Is Helping Trump Remake Federal Energy Policy,
POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/05/neil-chatterjeemcconnell-coal-federal-energy-policy-1634304 [https://perma.cc/7QVW-QTNK]; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–
824e (2018).
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The counterintuitive insights provided by Jon Michaels in his 2017
examination of the perils of privatization, Constitutional Coup, prove prescient
on this question. Michaels asserts that the reason to worry about privatization is
not that it diminishes agency power, but that it concentrates it, forming a
problematic pipeline between agency heads and private contractors.329 When
these parties act in tandem, Michaels worries, it subverts the “administrative
separation of powers” that typically triangulates power between agency heads,
agency staff, and civil society.330
Recent anti-renewables activity in RTOs is a case study in this kind of
aggrandizement of power. In the case of policies that prop up fossil fuel plants,
incumbent suppliers prove eager participants in proposing and pushing forward
these market reforms—even over the protest of many on the demand side of
energy markets.331 When these profit-driven priorities align with the political
priorities of agency heads, it is a recipe for aggressive agency action of dubious
democratic pedigree.332 FERC’s obligation to passively and reactively accept
any “just and reasonable” proposal filed by RTOs provides an agency
sympathetic to incumbents’ agenda with substantial cover in promoting
whatever private interests come to dominate the RTO.333 Thus, whereas FERC’s
action-forcing mechanisms are limited when it disagrees with RTOs’ policy
prerogatives, the deferential review required of RTOs’ protectionist proposals
aggrandizes the agency’s power in cases of private sector-regulator alignment.
One marker of the recent power grab on the part of incumbents aligned with
Trump administration officials can be seen in the recent profusion of dissenting
opinions from FERC commissioners—once a relative rarity.334 These dissents
track the increasing alarm among certain commissioners that the Trump
Administration’s FERC had abandoned the agency’s long-purported goal of
creating “fuel-neutral” energy markets335—and instead aligned itself with certain

329. See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 120–25.
330. Id. at 77, 81.
331. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Protest, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and Request for Recusal of
Commissioner McNamee of Public Citizen, Inc. at 2, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., FERC Docket Nos.
EL19-58 et al. (May 15, 2019) (asserting that PJM’s capacity market repricing plan prompts “a bad case
of déjà vu . . . [because it] is simply a regional version of U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry’s Grid
Resilience bailout push”).
333. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 7.
334. As noted in a 2017 letter signed by numerous senators, “FERC has a long tradition of
bipartisanship . . . most Commission votes are unanimous.” Letter from U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy
&
Nat.
Res.
to
President
Donald
J.
Trump
(Mar.
8,
2017),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/B7A6782D-D984-4D77-9C63-6340B5934390
[
https://perma.cc/CRH8-BTJE].
335. FERC has maintained throughout recent controversies that fuel neutrality, or resource
agnosticism, is a core commitment. See, e.g., Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC
¶ 61,205, at P 26 (Mar. 9, 2018).
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incumbents’ interests.336 The private-club-to-sympathetic-commissioner
pipeline facilitates the rapid translation of this policy alignment into
consequential reforms.
The joint challenges detailed in this part—internal governance flaws, state
powerlessness, and FERC diminishment/aggrandizement—all point to the
conclusion that decarbonizing the electricity sector will require more than just
developing and promoting smart substantive policies. Before these can be
adopted, the sector’s club-like governance structure must be reconsidered.
V.
WAYS FORWARD: A REFORM AGENDA
Here is where we have come: although the challenge of climate change is
pushing state and federal legislators and regulators to adopt policies and
priorities that privilege clean energy, the U.S. electricity grid is governed
predominantly by behemoth, incumbent industry members with little interest in
facilitating these changes. To build the clean energy economy needed for the
twenty-first century—the century of climate change—RTO governance reforms
are imperative.
The 2021 presidential transition presents an opening for FERC to pivot in
new directions. Consequently, reformers are now focusing on how a Biden
FERC could pursue policies that facilitate progress on climate change. But this
Article highlights the challenges of leaping to substantive reforms without a
critical examination of their institutional context. As I hope the analysis here
makes clear, the new administration—as well as state and public interest
advocates—should pay equal attention to grid governance reform as a
precondition for durable climate progress.
The goal for reformers should not be to abandon the regional format and
unwind back to a time when states had predominant control. Both technology
and policy prerogatives have usurped this possibility. Not only does today’s
interconnected grid make regional management economically and technically
desirable, but the growing policy mandate to transition to clean energy demands
even greater regional cooperation on climate.337 Indeed, many states in regions

336. In particular, Commissioner Glick has dissented from a number of recent FERC orders. See
Order on Tariff Filing, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Comm’r Glick, dissenting in part);
Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Granting in Part and Denying in Part Complaint, and
Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, Calpine Corp.
v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C (June 29, 2018) (Comm’r Glick, dissenting); Order on Tariff Filing, ISO
New Engl. Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Comm’r Glick, dissenting in part and concurring in part);
Constellation Mystic Power, LLC at 5, FERC Docket No. ER18-1639-000 (Dec. 20, 2018) (Comm’r
Glick, dissenting); Dissent in Part of Commissioner Richard Glick on ISO New England Inc. and New
England Power Pool Participants Committee at 2, FERC Docket No. ER19-444-000 (Jan. 29, 2019).
337. See JULIANA BRINT, JOSH CONSTANTI, FRANZ HOCHSTRASSER & LUCY KESSLER, YALE
ENV’T PROTECTION CLINIC, ENHANCED WESTERN GRID INTEGRATION: A LEGAL AND POLICY
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS ON CALIFORNIA’S CLEAN ENERGY LAWS 3–4 (2017); Klass, The Electric
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that previously declined to join an RTO have renewed their interest in
regionalizing grid governance—but have reservations regarding the risks of
prevailing RTO governance structures.338
The answer, then, is not to scrap RTOs but to transform them into regional
entities capable of accomplishing evolving public objectives.339 And so, the
critical questions become: What is the ideal institutional structure for regional
grid governance? How should federal and state regulators share this densely
technical, rapidly evolving space with the infrastructure companies that keep our
lights on? There are, I argue, four pathways—some mutually reinforcing—to
better grid governance: (1) pare back RTO authority; (2) increase regulatory
oversight; (3) better police sectoral corporate power; and (4) consider a public
option.
A. Pare Them Back
As mentioned earlier, FERC did not expect RTOs to come to have the range
of functions and functional policy-making authority that they do today. Instead,
it saw a role for these organizations in doing what utilities had long done, but on
a more efficient, integrated regional scale: managing the flow of electrons over
the transmission grid.340 Some RTOs have strayed further from this basic mission
than others. In particular, by turning resource adequacy over to markets, PJM
and ISO New England have cemented their reliance on convoluted stakeholder
processes to oversee a broad range of decisions about who gets to participate in
energy and capacity markets, and on what terms.341
In contrast, MISO has engendered less controversy than its eastern
neighbors by eschewing a mandatory capacity market and retaining more state

Grid at a Crossroads, supra note 233, at 1945–46 (proposing that RTOs be given authority for
transmission siting).
338. See H.B. 958, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Sess. 2019 (N.C. 2019); S.J. Res. 998, 2019–2020
Gen. Assemb., 123d Sess. (S.C. 2020); RONALD J. BINZ, CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING A
WESTERN REGIONAL SYSTEM OPERATOR 4 (2016) (“Designing a governing structure for a new western
Regional System Operator (RSO) that is acceptable to the various interests is as important as it is
difficult.”); Kristi E. Swartz, Legislative Push to Create N.C. Grid Operator Begins, E&E NEWS (Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060220039?t=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eenews.net%2Fst
ories%2F1060220039 [https://perma.cc/GY6Y-5BBY]; Kristi E. Swartz, Talk of Forming Grid
Operator
Erupts
in
Regulated
Carolinas,
E&E
NEWS
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060208513 [https://perma.cc/TG9U-YUUH].
339. See William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation
in America, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 721, 722 (2018) (“[C]ompetitive markets, when functioning
properly, can be powerful instruments for protecting consumers and facilitating fairness in exchange.”).
340. See Blumsack, supra note 50, at 148 (“With the introduction of RTO markets, the generation
resources over a number of utility control areas are cost-optimized and dispatched jointly.”); Osofsky &
Wiseman, supra note 28, at 10, 53–55 (celebrating the “hybridity” of RTOs for their ability to harness
private expertise).
341. See supra Part III.C.
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authority in resource adequacy determinations.342 Similarly, one might point to
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) as an RTO that has amassed relatively little power
beyond managing the grid and running basic energy markets.343 In the process,
SPP has managed to integrate impressive quantities of renewable energy and to
avoid enervating its state partners (at least, for the most part).344 To be sure, states
and RTOs in these regions have some issues remaining to work out, not least
around coal, but states at least have authority to act on these challenges.345
This comparative assessment points to one plausible reform: return RTOs
to a more basic set of functions. Most notably, there is rising support for the idea
of eliminating mandatory capacity markets from eastern RTOs.346 FERC should
be able to take this step unilaterally by declaring that the current mandatory
capacity market constructs are “unjust and unreasonable” under Federal Power
Act section 206 and ordering regions to find another solution to resource
adequacy that better accommodates states.347 One model worth considering is
that of California, where the California Public Utilities Commission and CAISO
share responsibility over resource adequacy in a way that tracks their
comparative advantages: CAISO is in charge of the technical elements of
forecasting resource adequacy requirements, while the state commission
oversees planning for how to meet these requirements.348
Restructuring control over resource adequacy would go a long way toward
remedying the mischief that pro-fossil companies have caused in ISO-New
England and PJM.349 Nevertheless, this move alone will not solve all governance
challenges. Already, there are controversies over how RTOs determine “price
342. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (describing how resource adequacy is established
in the region). See also Macey & Salovaara, supra note 141, at 29 (endorsing MISO’s simpler approach
to resource adequacy).
343. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (detailing the shared governance arrangement in
SPP, where the regional state committee retains authority over resource adequacy and many
transmission decisions); Order on Rehearing, Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,010, 61,052 (Oct.
1, 2004) (upholding SPP’s design in the face of arguments that it gave the regional state committee too
much power).
344. See BINZ, supra note 338, at 17 (explaining that the SPP Regional State Committee “has
historically maintained a collaborative relationship with SPP and has never filed comments adverse to
SPP’s FERC filings” (internal quotes omitted)).
345. See Kleckner, supra note 254 (discussing self-scheduling).
346. David Roberts, This Federal Agency Is Quietly, Profoundly Shaping Climate Policy, VOX
(May
22,
2019,
10:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/5/22/18631994/climate-change-renewable-energy-ferc
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/5/22/18631994/climate-change-renewable-energy-ferc] (quoting Commissioner
Glick expressing “serious reservations about mandatory capacity markets”). See also Chen & Murnan,
supra note 30 (advocating for greater state authority in resource adequacy).
347. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(e)(4)(a) (2018).
348. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Resource Adequacy, supra note 144.
349. See Jacob Mays, David P. Morton & Richard P. O’Neill, Asymmetric Risks and Fuel
Neutrality in Electricity Capacity Markets, 4 NATURE ENERGY 948, 953 (2019) (finding that capacity
markets are inherently biased against low-carbon resources, which tend to have high fixed costs and
near-zero operating costs).
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formation” in energy markets and ancillary service markets as well. Many of
these concerns are legitimate: as renewable energy drives the marginal-bid-based
clearing price in energy markets downward, there are important questions to be
answered regarding how to ensure adequate compensation to incent new
development.350 But again, the challenge comes down to who writes these rules
within the RTO context. To ensure that pricing in these basic markets remains
just and reasonable under changing conditions, FERC may need to take a heavier
hand in dictating what fair treatment looks like.351 In other words, the jig is up
on light-touch, experimental regulation of core RTO functions. These
organizations have proven themselves institutionally ill-suited to the type of selfmanagement idealized by new governance reformers.
All to say, if FERC were willing to assert its muscle, there are several steps
the agency could take to pare back the authority of RTOs to make them more
closely resemble the blueprint laid out two decades ago and embodied by some
of the less controversial modern RTO experiments. The decision to embrace such
reforms depends, of course, on the political and policy priorities of the agency at
a given time. And even if FERC were inclined to pursue reforms along these
lines, there would likely be industry backlash, which might manifest itself
through “hydraulics” that put pressure on other points of RTO decision-making
(notably, energy market rules).352 But at least FERC would have a narrower set
of potential market rule distortions to police and could therefore do so with more
vigilance.
B. Increase Public Oversight and Control
A second set of reforms involves accepting RTOs’ aggrandized modern
responsibilities and enhancing public oversight and control of these
organizations commensurately. As Anne Joseph O’Connell has observed in her
work on boundary organizations, these kinds of “centripetal” reforms—where
power moves away from private entities, back toward government—are not
common.353 Nevertheless, O’Connell suggests that these shifts are most likely
where “the benefits of more political control . . . increase compared to the
costs.”354 As this Article has traced, climate change places grid governance in

350. Renewable energy creates challenging dynamics in energy markets because its variable cost
is close to zero—thus creating a “missing money” problem for sources who rely on these markets to
cover their average costs. See Bushnell et al., supra note 141, at 12, 35–38; Macey & Salovaara, supra
note 141, at 22–25.
351. See James et al., supra note 30, at 18 (suggesting that FERC should be less deferential to
proposals coming from RTOs).
352. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999) (tracing the hydraulics of campaign finance reform, and arguing that
“[t]he money that reform squeezes out of the formal campaign process must go somewhere”).
353. See O’Connell, supra note 58, at 873.
354. Id. at 893.
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just such a position, as the risks of relying on private membership clubs to pursue
decarbonization initiatives that cut against their interests have become apparent.
Enhanced public control might emanate from both the states and FERC.
This Section describes options for each in turn. Moreover, it is worth noting that
this increased oversight could function alongside the reforms suggested in the
previous part, which focus on paring back RTOs’ responsibilities.
Here too, there are modern models. As described in Part II.C, California’s
ISO stands apart for having selected a unique governance structure in which the
ISO functions more like a state agency than a private club. This agency-like
structure allows California to have confidence that the goals of its ISO align with
the goals of the state. Such alignment has been particularly important as
California has dramatically ramped up its climate ambitions. CAISO boasts
openly about its commitment to a “Clean, Green Grid” and has adopted the
integration of renewable energy and demand-side technologies as a core part of
its mission.355
Transferring this model of pure political control beyond a single-state RTO
proves complicated, given that state interests within a region often do not align.
California itself has struggled with this issue as the state considers whether to
regionalize its RTO to enhance the integration of renewable energy.356 One
primary concern has been that a regional RTO that relinquished the state-agency
format would cede too much control to private players or sister states with
incompatible goals.357
But RTO reform need not go as far as the California model to create a more
robust role for states. MISO, for example, has incorporated state regulatory
authorities as the most powerful weighted voting bloc within its Membership
Committee—thus building in a more direct state oversight role of its markets.358
FERC might consider forcing other regions to reform their governance structures
to provide a similarly strong role for state interests (probably again through a
section 206 finding that RTOs’ current usurpation of state prerogatives creates
unjust and unreasonable prices, and that membership rules are practices affecting
these rates and therefore within FERC’s jurisdiction).359

355. What
Are
We
Doing
to
Green
the
Grid?,
CAL.
ISO,
http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/CleanGrid/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/W78P-5R4S].
356. See BINZ, supra note 348, at 4–6 (examining challenges of moving to a regional governance
system); PAULOS, supra note 131, at 5–7 (analyzing both sides of this debate); Lenhart et al., supra note
133, at 95, 102 (describing CAISO as “tightly aligned with California policy making processes and
achieving aggressive California policy goals”).
357. See CAL. ISO, PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE OF A REGIONAL ISO 2 (Oct. 7, 2016)
(describing “governance structure” as “one of the key topics that must be addressed for regionalization
to go forward”).
358. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 10 (describing MISO’s “relatively collaborative
culture” between the ISO and the states); Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 (showing that state
authorities receive a 16 percent weighted vote in MISO).
359. See Order Rejecting Revisions, New England Power Pool Participants Comm., 166 FERC
¶ 61,062, 61,276 (Jan. 29, 2019).
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A stronger reform would be to give regional state committees a veto-point
over RTO decision-making at a level superior to regular membership. Along
these lines, several states at the time of RTO formation proposed that the
organizations should be governed by “Federal-State Joint Boards,” which would
engage in collaborative decision-making on matters of shared jurisdiction.360
This idea was never fleshed into a fully formed proposal, because FERC opted
for the private RTO model. However, reinvigorated discussions along these lines
might now prove fruitful.
There are, of course, risks to giving states too much control over RTOs,
especially given the polarization among states regarding their attitudes toward
clean energy.361 In regions where many states oppose clean energy, a stronger
state oversight presence might not prove an antidote to challenges of incumbent
favoritism within the RTO. But this risk is baked into energy law: As the Federal
Power Act makes clear, “[t]he states, not the Commission, are the entities
responsible for shaping the generation mix.”362 To respect individual state
prerogatives, any reforms in the direction of greater state control should include
mechanisms to ensure that states cannot run rough-shod over each other’s
preferences. With such protections in place, I favor giving states greater de facto
control over energy generation, to mirror their putative legal control, in spite of
the risks. If that control results in more fossil-fueled energy, then changing state
policy preferences to better favor clean energy is a democratic battle that must
be fought and won at the state level. As hard as that battle may be, it is preferable
to continuing to cede control over the energy transition to the very companies
who stand to lose the most from it.
However, if FERC remains wary of so fully involving states in regional
market oversight, it could pursue more piecemeal, but still impactful, changes:
For example, recognizing the traditional state role over resource adequacy,
FERC could give regional state committees the right to approve or reject by
supermajority RTOs’ proposed changes in resource adequacy rules.363 Or
360. Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, at 11, Reg’l Transmission Orgs.,
FERC Docket No. RM99-02-000 (Aug. 20, 1999) (citing as potential precedents the “Susquehanna
River Basin Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission and the Joint Pipeline Office which
regulates the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System”). See also Initial Comments of the Nine State Commissions
Representing the East-Central/Midwest/Southwest (ECMS) Region at 7, Reg’l Transmission Orgs.,
FERC Docket No. RM99-2-000 (Aug. 23, 1999); Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission at
23–24, Reg’l Transmission Orgs., FERC Docket No. RM99-2-000 (Aug. 11, 1999); Smith, supra note
119, at 191–93 (describing legal pathways allowing for this sort of arrangement).
361. See generally LEAH CARDAMORE STOKES, SHORT CIRCUITING POLICY: INTEREST GROUPS
AND THE BATTLE OVER CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2020)
(tracing the difficult politics of clean energy in four “red” states over the last fifteen years and showing
how fossil-fuel allied interest groups dominate political and regulatory processes in Texas, Kansas,
Arizona, and Ohio).
362. Order on Rehearing and Clarification, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, 171 FERC ¶
61,035 (Comm’r Glick, dissenting, at P 5) (Apr. 16, 2020).
363. Given that SPP already allows its regional state committee control over resource adequacy,
this proposal seems legally plausible. See Chen & Murnan, supra note 30, at 15–16 (making this point).
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perhaps FERC could give regional state committees the right to file a competing
proposal when they disagree with an RTO’s section 205 filing—the same right
that is presently afforded to New England’s stakeholder governance group.364
So much for state involvement. What about FERC’s own oversight
strategies? As described in Part II.D, the circuit courts have diminished these as
well through opinions that limit the matters FERC can regulate and the extent to
which the agency can amend RTO proposals. FERC still has tools, however,
blunted though they may be. The agency could become more muscular in its use
of section 206 findings that regional tariffs are “unjust and unreasonable,” might
more actively control regional responses to such filings, and might use section
206 findings as the basis of a larger proceeding devoted to reconsidering the RTO
format.365
Ultimately, if RTOs are to retain their current powers, it is time to reckon
with the fact that these institutions are categorically different from investorowned utilities and should not be treated identically under the law. Section 205—
the section that provides that any RTO or utility filing that is “just and
reasonable” must be accepted—was meant for basic pricing schemes, not policymaking proposals.366 The ideal solution here would be for Congress to create a
special category of review for RTO tariff filings within the Federal Power Act,
providing FERC with the ability to amend portions of RTO filings and to reject
solutions that it finds plausible but inferior. These changes would recalibrate
FERC’s authority over RTOs to align it with the authority of other federal
agencies engaged in policy-making, which operate under the benefit of Chevron
deference to preferred agency solutions.367
C. Improve the Possibilities for Good Internal Governance
In addition to shedding RTO functions and/or enhancing federal and state
oversight, reformers might consider cabining the creeping dominance of the
sector by a few key players. For the reasons described above, I have limited
confidence that reforms focused on RTOs’ internal governance processes alone
could adequately recalibrate sectoral responsibility. But reforms in this vein
stand much better chance of success if FERC simultaneously peers behind the
curtain of agglomerated corporate power in the utility industry. Otherwise, no
matter how many tweaks FERC makes in voting sectors and their relative

See also Order Accepting Revisions to Transmission Owners Agreement, Midwest Indep. Transmission
Sys. Operator, Inc. & the Miso Transmission Owners, 143 FERC ¶ 61,165, 62,210 (May 23, 2013)
(accepting a MISO tariff amendment that gives the Organization of MISO States filing rights regarding
transmission cost allocation methodologies).
364. See Welton, Appendix A, supra note 14 for more on ISO-NE “jump ball” filings.
365. See Boyd, supra note 134, at 9 (arguing that FERC has unused authority to regulate price
formation in RTOs).
366. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 531–32
(2008) (discussing history of FERC deference to electricity “rates” under section 205).
367. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 322, and accompanying text.
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weights, heavyweight corporations with holdings that cut across these sectors
will continue to have the ability to manipulate votes toward their best interest.
Moreover, to the extent there is a perception that RTO boards often bend to the
most powerful interests in the industry when filing non-stakeholder-approved
tariff amendments, only a decrease in holding company authority could remedy
these feared backchannel dealings.
If FERC wanted to increase scrutiny of corporate mergers and their impact
on electricity governance, it could do so by drawing upon pre-existing regulatory
authority. FERC’s statutory charge is to ensure that proposed mergers are
“consistent with the public interest.”368 The agency’s current practice is governed
by a Merger Policy Statement, which FERC itself could amend.369 As utility
expert Scott Hempling has suggested, perhaps “public interest” review should
include not only a market power screen, but a more searching inquiry into
whether each additional merger might harm the overall structural competition of
the electricity sector.370 Alternatively, FERC might place conditions on mergers
that limit RTO stakeholder participation when the merger could create
opportunities for self-interested voting.371
For a more robust fix, Congress might revisit its 2005 decision to repeal
PUHCA, which repudiated the last vestiges of protection against mega-utilities.
Utilities, of course, suggest that the post-PUHCA diversification of their
holdings has brought significant gains—while others question this account.372
More work needs to be done to understand the full implications of utility merger
activity unleashed in 2005.373
Alternatively, if Congress and the executive branch prove unwilling, the
courts may present an increasingly plausible avenue for reigning in utility power.
To date, electricity corporations have largely been immunized from antitrust
challenges due to FERC oversight and regulation.374 The theory animating this

368. 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(4) (2018).
369. See FERC Order No. 592, Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the
Federal Power Act; Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595-01, 68,598 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 2 (2019)) [hereinafter Order 592]. Indeed, FERC has recently contemplated amendments to
this policy. See Notice of Inquiry, Modifications to Comm’n Requirements for Rev. of Transactions
Under Section 203 of the Fed. Power Act and Mkt-Based Rate Applications Under Section 205 of the
Fed. Power Act, FERC Docket No. RM16-21-000, 156 FERC ¶ 61,214 (Sept. 22, 2016) [hereinafter
RM 16-21].
370. See Hempling, supra note 173, at 268–72. See also Order 592, supra note 369, at 68,606
(listing “effects on competition” as one of three guiding criteria). To be sure, circuit precedent constrains
FERC to the extent that the agency cannot require merger applicants to show a positive benefit. See Pac.
Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 111 F.2d 1014, 1016 (1940) (creating this constraint).
371. See 16 U.S.C.§ 824b(b) (2018) (granting FERC the authority to place “necessary or
appropriate” conditions on mergers).
372. See Hempling, supra note 173, at 238, 279 (explaining how diversification poses risks in a
landscape with regulated and unregulated markets).
373. Id. at 240 (observing dearth of studies on “long-term effects of the industry’s
consolidation”).
374. See Vaheesan, supra note 28.
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immunization is that FERC’s review of utilities’ filed rates obviates the need for
judicial antitrust scrutiny.375 However, in light of the significant changes in the
industry, scholars have questioned whether courts should continue to allow the
filed rate doctrine to stand as a bar to claims of industry collusion,376 and the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the applicability of state antitrust laws to
FERC-regulated natural gas pipelines.377 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recently
found that another public-private boundary entity—Amtrak—violated the Due
Process Clause through its dual roles as competitor and regulator of train
operations.378 In that opinion, the court signaled a growing skepticism of such
arrangements, observing that “government’s increasing reliance on publicprivate partnerships portends an even more ill-fitting accommodation between
the exercise of regulatory power and concerns about fairness and
accountability.”379 Although there is no rock-solid case under current precedent
to assert that RTOs’ self-interested rulemakings create either an antitrust or due
process challenge, continued display of an incumbency bias could push courts
towards accepting a theory crafted along these lines.
D. Explore a Public Option
There is, finally, a more radical option that reformers might consider:
Taking a cue from several European countries and the California model,
management of the grid could be made more thoroughly public. This option
would go much further than the suggestions for enhanced control offered in
subpart (b), and would face substantial—perhaps politically insurmountable—
opposition from the utility industry. Nevertheless, in a moment where the
national conversation about climate change policy has tacked in a more
progressive direction, it is worth considering. Indeed, if infrastructure
development on the scale envisioned by the proponents of a Green New Deal is
to succeed, a publicly owned or operated grid might form a critical institutional
piece of the puzzle.380 Moreover, to integrate ever-increasing levels of variable
renewable energy, experts are converging on the conclusion that the U.S. grid
would be best run as a single, national, coordinated machine.381 Exploration of

375. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory
Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1593–94 (2003).
376. See id. at 1592, 1597; Vaheesan, supra note 28, at 921.
377. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S 373, 376 (2015).
378. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 27–29 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
379. Id. at 31.
380. Cf. The Green New Deal, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/en/issues/green-new-deal
[https://perma.cc/2K78-RMET] (calling for creation of a new Power Marketing Administration to build
out U.S. renewable energy infrastructure to achieve “100 percent sustainable energy for electricity and
transportation by no later than 2030”).
381. See, e.g., David Roberts, We’ve Been Talking About a National Grid for Years. It Might Be
Time To Do It., VOX (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:00 AM) https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2018/8/3/17638246/national-energy-grid-renewables-transmission
[https://perma.cc/7G4T-CPWX] (collecting studies and explaining, “[v]irtually every scenario that has
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new ways of structuring such an organization that avoid the pathologies of the
current RTO format should help advance this pressing conversation.
Considerably more work is needed to develop the contours of a public grid
governance model—work that is beyond the scope of this Article. But in its
broad outlines, it might resemble what the group Public Citizen asked FERC to
consider back in the 1990s. Recognizing the inherent conflict between consumer
interests and private transmission owners,382 Public Citizen urged FERC to
create “three publicly-owned non-profit transmission companies (public
transcos) [that would] own and operate the transmission systems . . . .”383 These
public transcos would have “no affiliates and no subsidiaries,” and would be run
by a “publicly-accountable board of directors . . . .”384 As we know, FERC
declined to pursue the public transco model. Several European countries,
however, have gone this route, with ownership of the grid vested in a single stateowned enterprise.385 California provides an alternative model of political control
without ownership, and has proven that more direct political control can align
regulatory priorities and grid governance.386
How FERC might effectuate a transition to public ownership or control is
a complex question. Perhaps a bold FERC, looking at the necessary pace and
scale of decarbonization, might justify ordering significant RTO governance
reform or transmission divestment to a public entity as a necessary precondition
for “just and reasonable” rates in the era of climate change.387 It is, however,
unclear whether the federal courts would be willing to sanction such profound
industry restructuring under longstanding statutory authority.388 It might take a
full-throated congressional effort to abandon the private grid.
I mention the public option not as a likely short-term solution, but to round
out the picture of possible governance structures as policy-makers think about
the future of the grid—and to refuse to be constrained to the narrowed imaginary

the US hitting ambitious decarbonization goals involves a massive buildout of transmission to eventually
create a national grid”).
382. Comments of Public Citizen at 3–4, Reg’l Transmission Orgs., FERC Docket No. RM992-000 (Aug. 16, 1999).
383. Id. at 5.
384. Id. at 6.
385. See Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon, A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a
State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France, 26 ENERGY J. 181, 183–85 (2005) (describing French
system); Hogne Lerøy Sataøen, Ole Andreas Brekke, Susana Batel & Martin Albrecht, Towards a
Sustainable Grid Development Regime? A Comparison of British, Norwegian, and Swedish Grid
Development, 9 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 178, 181–82 (2015) (describing the Norwegian and
Swedish systems).
386. See supra Part II.B.2.
387. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2018).
388. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (invalidating
EPA’s “Tailoring Rule” on grounds of statutory overreach); Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 3
(observing that agencies rarely “go for broke” when using outdated statutes to address new problems,
as they are “cognizant of the preferences of their political overseers and the risk of being overturned in
the courts”).
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that the privatization movement has left us. Even the threat of a public takeover
might prod RTOs to relent to the less thoroughgoing, but still impactful, reforms
suggested above. In any event, the next step down the road to public transcos
should almost certainly be more rigorous comparative study of how public
models have performed in other countries, and the possibilities and limitations
they might face in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Commentators have long opined that democracy presents a key impediment
to progress on climate change, because each of us is psychologically and
structurally hard-wired to vote against the long-term interests of humanity.389
States and localities have begun to overcome this putative hurdle to climate
progress: One-third of Americans now live in a city or state with a 100 percent
clean energy mandate or goal.390 Now that federal leaders too are prioritizing
climate action, many hope for swift results via executive branch authority.
However, political progress has unleashed a new effort by fossil fuel incumbents
to structure the energy system in their favor.
To remedy this mismatch between democratic priorities and grid
governance, this Article has argued that the functionally privatized model that
FERC selected to run competitive electricity markets two decades ago must be
reformed to match modern public aims. Reforms in this sector must be
calculated, swift, and decisive if the United States is to achieve anything close to
the clean energy transition demanded by atmospheric physics.
At the same time, the Article has contextualized RTOs as sectoral
symptoms of troubling trends toward privatization and agglomeration that
pervade the modern U.S. economy and the institutions ostensibly designed to
shape and control it.391 In this context, RTOs highlight the importance of
institutional structure when seeking to deploy a legal framework as broad and
powerful as public utility. An expansion of public utility law to new sectors could
help to curb the extreme corporate domination of this second Gilded Age. But

389. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009); Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect
Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15
ENV’T VALUES 397, 397 (2006); Robert R.M. Verchick, Culture, Cognition, and Climate, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. 969, 973–75; Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCH. 290, 290 (2011); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENV’T L. 241, 242 (2000); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299; Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503
(2007).
390. See UCLA LUSKIN CTR., supra note 17, at 2.
391. Cf. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, 3–5, 45 (1944) (illustrating how markets have always been politically and
historically embedded, and how the nineteenth century idea of the “self-regulating market system”
represented a violent rupture from this norm).
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before embracing this strategy, the modern potential of public utility must first
be reclaimed within the electricity sector, which will either embrace the
existential challenge of climate change or take us all down with it.

